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Introduction 
 
 
Topic: A structural contradiction in Bakhtin’s concept of the carnivalesque, as 
exemplified in Eco’s novel The Name of the Rose. 
 
Research objects: The first object of analysis is M. Bakhtin’s concept of carnival and the 
carnivalesque. The first level of analysis takes the assumption that the world of Bakhtin’s 
aesthetics is consistent, and interprets Bakhtin’s carnival as the relationship between his 
earlier literary and cultural concepts of novel and epic; in other words, what is carnival, 
and how does it incorporate and systematise Bakhtin’s concepts of epic and novel as 
outlined in The Dialogic Imagination? 
 
The second object of analysis is U. Eco’s The Name of the Rose, in this case interpreted 
as A). a reconstruction of the world of Bakhtinian aesthetics, and B). a critical 
commentary of Bakhtin’s concept of carnival.  
 
 
Research materials: the main texts in which the concepts of carnival, grotesque and 
heteroglossia appear (Rabelais and his World, 1965; essays from The Dialogic 
Imagination, 1975), and in this context, supporting texts such as The Name of the Rose, 
the short essay The frames of comic ‘freedom’, in which Eco explains his views towards 
carnival. 
 
Goals: To show, to show that Eco’s novel recreates the world of Bakhtin’s aesthetics, 
including its flaws, and through a close reading of inverted binary oppositions in Eco’s 
novel, to show that that the world of Bakhtinian aesthetics is not in fact consistent, due to 
its misuse of binary oppositions. 
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Aims: The first aim of this work is to identify a structural contradiction within Bakhtin’s 
concept of the carnivalesque. The second aim is to show how Eco’s The Name of the 
Rose expresses this structural contradiction.  
 
Research questions: (1) What is the difference between epic, the novelistic and the 
carnivalesque, and how do these concepts are related to one another?  (2) How does The 
Name of the Rose criticise Bakhtin’s concept of the carnivalesque? (3) Does Eco hold any 
specific views on Bakhtin’s carnivalesque, and if so, do these views make their way into 
his novel? (4) Is a carnivalesque model the only one that places the concepts of the epic 
and novelistic into system of mutually dependent terms? 
 
 
General Methodology: Since methodologies for semiotic analyses tend to build on top 
of each other and overlap, in this case it is not useful to stick to a single author’s 
proposed method for the entire analysis. For instance, if I were to apply a Greimasian 
analysis of an isolated phenomenon using the semiotic square, my work would have little 
meaning or significance outside of exemplifying this one method of analysis. The point 
of this work is to show an inner contradiction in Bakhtin’s use of the carnivalesque. I use 
Eco’s novel as an extended example because the work affords it.  
In the early stages of writing this work, I tried to identify Eco’s own voice in his 
novel—assuming it is even there—and realised that the ‘voice’ I found corresponds to 
Eco’s voice in The frames of comic ‘freedom’. Eco’s criticism of carnival in The 
frames… was present in The Name of the Rose as well. Since this work aims to trace 
Eco’s implicit critique of carnival, I aim to identify Eco’s own methodology for his 
critique of carnival in The frames, and apply it myself in a close reading of The Name of 
the Rose. Eco seems to have a vague and intuitive method that is consistent with many 
points made by Derrida in his works on deconstruction. Eco’s work shows that he agrees 
with Derrida in criticising structuralism’s use of binary oppositions1.  
                                                
1 Eco’s first academic book, The Open Work states that in structuralism, “Communication occurs to the 
extent to which a given message is decoded according to a pre-established code shared by both the 
addresser and the addressee” (Eco 1962:219). This pre-established code is a universal, or as young Eco 
calls it, the ‘Ur-code’ that structuralism aims to discover (Eco 1962: 220–221).  However, to imply that the 
Ur-code exists is to imply that there are ideal interpretations of texts (to interpret according to the Ur-code).  
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In isolating fundamental oppositions, such as raw-cooked, day-night, sun-moon, and many of 
more exotic and unexpected sorts, Lévi-Strauss is describing codes: sets of categories drawn from 
a single area of experience and related to one another in ways that make them useful logical tools 
for expressing other relations […] The general implication of this method, which has become a 
fundamental principle of structural and semiotic analysis, is that elements of a text do not have 
intrinsic meaning as autonomous entities but derive their significance from oppositions which are 
in turn related to other oppositions in a process of theoretically infinite semiosis. (Culler 1981: 29) 
 
Ferdinand de Saussure writes in his Course on General Linguistics that in language, 
meaning generates from differences among disparate terms in a system (Saussure 1983: 
120); In Of Grammatology, Jacques Derrida agrees with this point, and famously says 
that there is no unmediated text that is independent of the differences given to it by its 
context (Derrida 1976: 220) Jonathan Culler explains, “If a text compares a woman with 
the moon, that predication has no inherent meaning; significance depends on the 
opposition between sun and moon” (Culler 1981: 29). 
Therefore following Saussure, we can clarify the point: meaning is created by 
differences, so it is necessary for signs, or terms to be organised in a system in order to 
generate meaning, since differences are only possible in systems. Following this 
assumption, a binary opposition would be the simplest and most primitive system, having 
only two terms, each term defined by the other through difference (that is, in a binary 
system, there is a positive term and negative term). 
Lévi-Strauss uses the binary opposition as the basic unit of meaning in his 
analysis of myth (Lévi-Strauss 1955). The binary system is self-referencing. This simple 
unit of meaning has the problem of referring more or less only to itself; each side defines 
itself by negating the other. This may not have been a problem for Lévi-Strauss, whose 
terms in binaries are mostly descriptive, but it is a problem for Bakhtin, who created a 
binary opposition with two agonistic terms, and wanted one term to be free of the other.  
Therefore every sign—verbal or otherwise—may be interpreted at different 
levels, in configurations and functions “which are never prescribed by its “essence”, but 
emerge from a play of differences” (Derrida 2001: 267). Structure 
 
                                                                                                                                            
In contrast, open works “Allow codes to evolve into new ones, to merge their branches rather than 
to trace their supposed origin”, and to focus on the production of meaning rather than the discovery of 
universal textual interpretations (Eco 1962: 221). Eco later wrote two historiographies on the Ur-code, The 
Search for the Perfect Language (1993) and Serendipities: Language and Lunacy (1998). 
 7 
 […] has always been neutralised or reduced, and this by a process of giving it a centre or 
of referring it to a point of reference. The function of this centre was not only to orient, 
balance, and organise the structure […] but above all to make sure that the organising 
principle of the structure would limit what we might call play of the structure […] the 
notion of a structure lacking any centre represents the unthinkable itself. (Derrida 2001: 
351-352) 
 
Derrida’s thoughts can be divided into themes, or statements: difference produces 
meaning (after Saussure), signification in a system of binary oppositions create meaning 
when each term defines itself against its opposite, in such systems one side of the binary 
is more powerful than the other (one term corresponds to presence, and the other to 
absence), and therefore all binary oppositions are inherently unstable. Since he works 
with the pre-assumption that texts are made up of binary oppositions, then Western 
metaphysics depends as much on absence as it does on presence. This current work will 
only use some of these points, and my close analysis of The Name of the Rose will not 
answer any questions about texts in general or Western metaphysics.  
If binary oppositions are unstable, then its two sides have the potential to switch 
places, and the dominance of either side is arbitrary; for instance, one of Derrida’s main 
binary oppositions is presence/absence. Although Western metaphysics tends to favour 
presences above absences, the concepts themselves only make sense when defined as the 
opposite of each other. Like Derrida, Bakhtin assumes that in Western metaphysics, one 
side of the binary holds preference over the other. His version of presence/absence is 
expressed as centre/periphery, or epic/novel, in which ‘epic’ corresponds with an 
established genre on the literary level, and the centre on the cultural level; whereas 
‘novel’ corresponds with a much younger genre on the literary level, and the peripheries 
on the cultural level. 
Additionally Western metaphysics do not have to be based on binary oppositions; 
simply come up with a system of differences that include more than two mutually-
dependent and mirroring terms, and self-referencing among the terms would decrease. A 
system can include shades of graduated differences instead of only black-and-white 
opposites. I would argue that Yurij Lotman successfully comes up with a system like this 
in his semiospheric model of culture, but this is besides the point of my current work. In 
any case, Bakhtin tries to make a heterogeneous, non-arbitrary model as well, but fails 
because he uses two terms—the epic and the novel—in a binary opposition.  
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 Eco and Derrida’s methodology do overlap in many ways, but my purpose here is 
not to analyse Bakhtin or Eco’s work using Derrida’s method of deconstruction as it 
pertains to text and Western metaphysics. The work focuses on Eco’s implicit or potential 
identification and deconstruction of the epic/novel binary opposition central to Bakhtin’s 
work. I do use deconstruction, but maybe it is better to say that I only identify Eco’s 
casual use of deconstruction in The frames of comic ‘freedom’ and The Name of the Rose.  
 
Current state of research on this topic: As yet I have not found any works that present 
a direct critique of Bakhtin’s carnival, using Eco’s The Name of the Rose as an 
illustration of carnival’s problems. However, since this thesis must, like all writings, 
stand “on the shoulders of giants”, it is lucky that scholarship of both Bakhtin and Eco is 
in general both abundant and relevant, although during Stalin’s purges this was not 
always the case. 
In 1990, Caryl Emerson teamed up with Gary Saul Morson to write Mikhail 
Bakhtin: Creation of a Prosaics. In her later book, The First Hundred Years of Mikhail 
Bakhtin, Emerson explains that “prosaics was his [Bakhtin’s] starting point of studying 
novelistic prose” (Emerson 1997: 35), and that to Bakhtin, the novel is “a voracious 
incorporation of genres and its proliferation of voices” (Emerson 1997: 35), which 
allowed the reader more options and freedom of interpretation than the comparatively 
rigid genre of poetry. Emerson does not mean to say that Bakhtin rejects poetry as art, 
and in fact, Bakhtin was fond of poetry, although it was not the focus of his academic 
writings (Emerson 1997: 35). 
 In the West, Emerson’s The First Hundred years of Mikhail Bakhtin (1997) is the 
most comprehensive guide to Bakhtin studies. It presents a historiography of Bakhtinian 
criticism in the post-Stalinist Soviet Union, and discusses “outsideness” as a theme in 
Bakhtin’s writings, as well as his work on Dostoevsky’s novels, folk culture, 
anachronistic historical accounts and carnival. 
Until the Gorbachev years, Bakhtin’s writings found most of their audience 
outside the USSR (Emerson 1997: 38), although that is not to say the Russians ignored 
Bakhtin completely. After the same Stalinist purges that repressed Bakhtin’s career and 
writings came to an end, the Russian literary circle found it necessary to redefine their 
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goals, in order to build a new working environment. Thus, the period of de-Stalinisation 
in the 1950s allowed formalist theory to re-emerge in the Moscow; and Roman 
Jakobson’s work was re-introduced (Emerson 1997, 41). When Jakobson’s opponents 
argued that his work was socially and culturally irrelevant, the Tartu-Moscow School of 
semiotics intervened by trying to integrate Jakobson’s formalism with the Marxist 
approaches to literature that were popular at the time: 
 
For all its reliance on models and codes, then, and for all its fierce eclecticism and independence, 
the research of the Tartu school seemed to many Russians of the 1960s and 1970s reassuringly 
close to familiar Marxist-humanist concerns, both in its search for a materialist aesthetics and in 
its careful attention to sociohistorical questions. It promised the rigor of Formalism without any 
embarrassing neglect of content or social responsibility—that is, it promised “Structuralism with a 
human face”. (Emerson 1997: 42) 
 
 
It was in this newly (relatively) open-minded context that in the late 1950s, 
students of the Gorky Institute of World Literature in Moscow rediscovered Bakhtin’s 
1929 work, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, and were overjoyed to find the author still 
alive and teaching in the geographical peripheries of the Soviet Union (Emerson 1997: 
42). Some work on Bakhtin’s research began, including in Moscow and St. Petersburg, 
though it would appear that Tartu showed more interest. Georgij M. Fridlender thought 
that Bakhtin was “monologic and didactic” in his insistence on polyphony. This is a case 
of someone saying Bakhtin’s work contains an inner contradiction2 (Emerson 1997: 166). 
Other critics include Dmitri S. Likhachev and Anton M. Panchenko in their 1976 work, 
The World of Laughter in Early Russia; however, Yurij M. Lotman and Boris A. 
Uspenskij argued against Likhachev and Panchenko in their 1977 work, New aspects on 
the study of Ancient Rus3, in which they argued that Likhachev and Panchenko made the 
mistake of applying the world of Rabelaisian laughter—the subject of Bakhtin’s 
writings—to the worldview of medieval Russia (Emerson 1997: 271). 
 Shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian and Western scholars 
were able to meet. At a conference in the 1990s, Emerson notes that 
 
The foreigners’ presentations tended to be at the theoretical cutting edge and “outside” Bakhtin’s 
lived experience; several were recognizably postmodernist, some were feminist and deconstructed 
                                                
2 Фирдлендер, Георгий Михаилович. 1964. Реализм Достоевского. 
3 Лотман, Юрий Михаилович; Успенский, Борис Андреевич. 1977. Новые аспекы изучения культуры 
Древней Руси. 
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in their approach, quite a few were critical of Bakhtin’s formulations. Others were imaginative 
expansions of his thought into genre theory, translation practice, and the visual arts. We outsiders, 
it seemed, were forever grasping a small amount of Bakhtin and then applying it to concerns 
within our own fields of expertise. For the majority of the Russian delegate, in contrast, Bakhtin 
himself was the field. (Emerson 1997: 33) 
 
It would appear that the Western scholars, with limited access to Bakhtin’s biographical 
details and the Russian context of his works, could do little more except to apply his 
theories to their own academic research. In Russia, however, postmodernism, feminism 
and deconstruction had not been as prominent in academic discourse as they are in the 
West, therefore the Russians worked with what they had, with the result that 
 
A large portion of their papers were archival, pedagogical, closely argued philosophical 
investigations, at times simply reverent paraphrase. Textological problems were cleared up, details 
of Bakhtin’s biography filled in. (Emerson 1997: 33) 
 
Tsvetan Todorov and Julia Kristeva—both Bulgarians working in Paris—are two 
of the more famous Western scholars who incorporated Bakhtinian concepts into their 
own fields of study. Todorov wrote Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogical Principle (1984) as 
a guide to Bakhtinian thought, but according to Emerson and Morson, Todorov tries to 
find an underlying system underlying Bakhtin’s thought, even though such a system does 
not even exist (Emerson and Morson 1990: 5). Todorov may have been misguided in his 
attempts to organise Bakhtin’s work, but while writing his book, Todorov was able to 
discover his own work by expanding Bakhtin’s concept of dialogue into his own thoughts 
on intertextuality. Julia Kristeva also connects Bakhtin’s notion of dialogue with her own 
work on intertextuality, beginning in a 1966 presentation that eventually turned into part 
of her paper Le mot, le dialogue, et le roman (Word, dialogue, and the novel) (Lesic-
Thomas 2008).  
As Emerson mentioned, studies including Bakhtin range from feminism to the 
visual arts; however, I have found relatively few that examine his use of binary 
oppositions. In 2001, Jørgen Bruhn and Jan Lundquist’s The Novelness of Bakhtin: 
Perspectives and possibilities comes close, claiming that “Reading Bakhtin, one is struck 
by the way he thinks in terms of theoretical oppositions while at the same time, he is 
obsessed by overcoming exactly the same oppositions” (Bruhn, Lundquist 2001: 23). 
They list some oppositions underlying Bakhtin’s work, such as form/content, 
style/thematics and autonomy/history, as well as the binary oppositions 
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synchrony/diachrony, literary language/vernacular and individual/social. In Michael 
Holquist’s Why is God’s Name a Pun? Bakhtin’s theory of the novel in the light of 
theophilology (2001), the binary opposition at the centre of Bakhtin’s works is 
holy/profane. However, this paper primarily concerns Bakhtin’s use of language 
(following a tradition that includes Jakobson, Shpet, Trubetskoj, Benveniste and Bataille, 
Holquist believes), as a “trilogic” sign that transcends binary oppositions; that is, it is the 
sign and referent at the same time (Bruhn, Lundquist 2001: 24).  
 
Since The Name of the Rose works on many levels of interpretation, a number of critical 
essays have been written about it, especially in the 1980s. Most of them explore the novel 
from the point of view of various academic disciplines, and in one example, from the 
point of view of its author’s ethnic background. Some of these essays are of higher 
quality than others; for instance, Carl Rubino’s The Invisible Worm: ancients and 
moderns in “The Name of the Rose” (1985) claims that William “[…] shows an 
unsettling familiarity with the details of inquisition” (Rubino 1985), appearing to forget 
that before the events of the novel, William had worked as a professional inquisitor (Eco 
1984a: 168). Rubino’s paper loosely relates William of Baskerville to the fictional 
characters Ireneo Funes and Sherlock Holmes, as well as to the historical figures Sir Isaac 
Newton and Ilya Prigogine, on the grounds that all of these characters sought order in the 
world, or tried to perceptually organise it in some way. In Naming the Rose: readers and 
codes in Umberto Eco’s novel, Steven Sallis discusses the multiple interpretations 
possible for The Name of the Rose: 
 
A reader could explore The Name of the Rose on several levels. Descriptions of monastic and civil 
rivalry, the troubled history of the papacy in the fourteenth century, and lists of medieval herbs, 
beasts, and favourite books could captivate a reader with interests in the Renaissance. The unusual 
murders, clues to the murderer’s identity, and the narrator’s observations would lead the adept 
mystery-reader to the text in order to try to solve the mystery of the novel’s intrigue. The 
exposition of Eco’s semiotic theory would lead the reader interested in literary criticism to another 
level of reading, the examinations of the role of the reader interpreting a text. (Sallis 1986) 
 
Sallis argues for Adso and William as naïve and critical readers, which is valuable for 
seeing the story through two different eyes, but problematic in that the reader is then 
limited to seeing through the eyes of only two readers, limiting not only the possibilities 
of interpretation, but also ignoring the other points of view in the novel, such as those of 
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Ubertino, Abo and Jorge. Leticia Reyes-Tatinclaux’s Missing Eco: on reading “The 
Name of the Rose” as library criticism takes an unusual perspective by exploring the 
book as a book about books-within-books; however, her paper acknowledges that a 
reader “[…] must not reduce this to mere ‘library fiction’” (Reyes-Tatinclaux 1989).  
Robert F. Yeager, in his 1985 article Fear of writing, or Adso and the poisoned text 
compares Eco’s narration techniques with those of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle and Ian 
Fleming. In 1989, David G. Baxter’s Murder and mayhem in a medieval abbey: the 
philosophy of The Name of the Rose reads Eco’s book as a philosophical novel, but the 
only philosophical concepts it explores are Aristotelian logic and abductive theories. 
The Egyptian literary researcher Sabry Hafez draws upon her own cultural 
background in The Name of the Rose: time and dialectics of parallel structures (Hafez 
1989). Her paper points out many interesting observations about the novel’s 
correspondence between its meta and object levels. For instance—it may be useful to 
remind the reader that The Name of the Rose is a frame novel that begins with the 
discovery of Adso’s manuscript—Hafez traces the temporal milestones of Adso’s 
narrative as a text: 
 
Late November 1327  The date of the narrated events  
Late 14th century  The writing of the manuscript  
17th century   Approximate date of the Latin edition  
1842    The date of the French edition  
1968    The handing over of the manuscript  
1970    The vindication of its authenticity  
1980    The publication of the Italian version of the text (Hafez 1989) 
 
Hafez connects these seven incarnations of the text to the seven murders in the abbey, 
displaying a beautiful parallel. In addition, the pace of the text speeds up just like the 
pace of events during the last three days at the abbey—another correspondence between 
the novel’s meta and object levels (Hafez 1989). Hafez also points out the similarity 
between Adso of Melk and Shahrazad (Scheherazade), the narrator of The Arabian 
Nights. She argues that both are storytellers using narrative as a means of survival (Hafez 
1989), yet whereas Shahrazad does so within her lifetime, Adso, by committing his to 
manuscript, preserves his voice even centuries after his death. Yet this observation 
applies to many fictional narrators, and is not unique to Adso and Shahrazad. 
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Rocco Capozzi’s 1989 paper Palimpsets and laughter: the dialogical pleasures of 
unlimited intertextuality in The Name of the Rose discusses Eco’s novel in a Bakhtinian 
context, noting the text’s abundant use of quotations, which gives it a hybrid structure. 
While Capozzi does mention that the role of laughter in Eco’s novel may have something 
to do with Bakhtin’s carnival, he does so only to say he will not explore this issue further 
in the current paper.  
Theresa Coletti wrote a collection of excellent essays in 1988, collectively called 
Naming the Rose: Eco, medieval signs, and modern theory, in which she explores a series 
of themes in Eco’s novel, including heresy as interpretation, palimpsest and 
deconstruction. Coletti’s aim is to present Eco’s work as a novel of ideas, and to “address 
the relationship between the novel’s medievalism and its preoccupation with signs, 
focusing on the thorough grounding of its semiotic concerns in its representation of 
medieval culture” (Coletti 1988: 4–5). She aims to show that Eco uses accurate historical 
details in his novel “to reflect on the uses of the past and on history itself” (1988: 5), and 
so “out of a concrete rendering of medieval social and intellectual life Eco substantively 
crafts a distinctly contemporary statement about language and meaning, responsible 
intellectual activity, and the nature of critical discourse” (1988: 5). 
We get closer with Evelyn Cobley’s 1989 paper, Closure and Semiosis in Mann’s 
“Dr. Faustus” and Eco’s “The Name of the Rose”, which interprets Thomas Mann’s Dr. 
Faustus as an intertext for The Name of the Rose. She writes,  
 
“My purpose here is to take a close look at these oppositions, discussing them as ideologically 
weighted constructs rather than as relatively static or equal terms […] My approach is meant to 
complement Walter E. Stephens' excellent interpretation of Rose as a "showdown between 
medieval theocentric semiosis and a version of Peircean unlimited semiosis", and to apply certain 
aspects of Eco's theory of semiotics to Faustus. What I hope to show above all is that any gesture 
to close off an inside (one side of the opposition) from an outside (the other side) is doomed to 
reproduce what it means to exclude.” (Cobley 1989) 
 
At this point, her work may seem to be a direct precursor to mine (aside from the 
discussions on Mann’s Dr. Faustus), as it makes the argument that Eco’s novel contains a 
number of unstable binary oppositions. In addition, Cobley makes the distinction between 
the “closed”, single-referent nature of Christian hermeneutics (which she calls “medieval 
semiotics”), and the Peircean concept of unlimited semiosis. However, Cobley does not 
deconstruct this meta-binary opposition between medieval and Peircean (closed and 
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open) semiotics at the core of her paper, therefore it ends without addressing the 
relationship between single-referent and referent-free interpretation.  
The work that is thematically closest to the topic of this thesis is Thomas 
Sebeok’s 1984 anthology Carnival!, a collection of three essays which includes Eco’s 
The frames of comic ‘freedom’. Each of the three writers uses a different definition of 
carnival, and Eco’s essay is the only one that has relevant to Bakhtinian theory. What Eco 
says in this essay is significant, since it explains the critical viewpoint towards carnival, 
which he shows in The Name of the Rose, although this paper does not mention the novel 
itself.  
 In short, most of the critical essays on The Name of the Rose were written in the 
decade of its publication. It would appear that literary and cultural scholars have moved 
on to discuss Eco’s more recent works, fictional and non-fictional alike. Although The 
Name of the Rose has not been under much discussion in the recent years, I find it 
important to bring it up again, as there are issues that have not been resolved earlier, and 
are still relevant today. In addition, my argument does not stay within the novel, but 
merely uses it as an illustrative device to discuss Bakhtin’s concepts of carnival and the 
carnivalesque, in order to make a point about the role of reference in Bakhtin’s concepts 
of novel and epic. In other words, although my thesis uses a close reading of Eco’s novel, 
this close reading is not the point of the work. I discuss Bakhtin’s literary and cultural 
concepts within the context of Eco’s novel in order to give some form to an otherwise 
abstract topic.   
 There are two works that probably discuss Bakhtin’s carnival and Eco’s 
commentary; however, it is difficult to access either of them. In 1995, Ben Taylor from 
Nottingham Trent University wrote his thesis Bakhtin, carnival and comic theory. 
According to an Internet search, the thesis mentions that Umberto Eco is a critic of 
carnival; however, the full work, even the abstract, is not easily accessible. Today Taylor 
works as a lecturer in the field of media and cultural studies, and does not appear to have 
published any significant works on Bakhtin and carnival.  
There is a 2013 work by Nadia Bobbio entitled Umberto Eco and Rabelaisian 
Grotesque: Bakhtinian Echoes and Sociopolitical Criticism in the Fictional Works of 
Umberto Eco; however, I could not find neither a copy nor publisher, or even any record 
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of a citation. Upon further examination, it turns out that this work is Bobbio’s PhD thesis, 
and that throughout her studies, Bobbio had been working in finance and investments. 
After receiving her degree from Trinity College, Dublin, Bobbio left academia to 
continue her work in the finance sector. 
It is disappointing that such an important theme should be neglected, especially 
since Taylor and Bobbio came very close. In any case, no research on Bakhtin or Eco can 
be considered wasted, as each work adds some height to “the shoulders of giants”—
Bakhtin studied Dostoevsky, Emerson studied Bakhtin, Eco responded to Bakhtin, and a 
list of scholars are still continuing the conversation about Eco’s long list of works—and 
in any case, Eco’s critique of Bakhtin’s use of binary oppositions has not yet been said, 
therefore from the “eclecticism and independence” of the Tartu school of semiotics, my 
work will humbly propose to add a few notes to the discourse.  
 
Relevance: If one of Bakhtin’s most prominent ideas does indeed work against the 
author’s strongly-stated intentions, it may be necessary to understand how they do so, 
before applying these ideas—along with their mistakes—in a broader and more practical 
cultural context. The point of Bakhtin’s concept of the novelistic is to destabilise what he 
considered an overly structured world, where cultural structures and categories are strict 
to the point of being oppressive. However, destabilisation and revolution are both 
dangerous concepts that should not be taken too far. I believe that Bakhtin is too extreme 
in his destruction of existing systems, and instead of creating a model for a healthy, open 
culture, he creates something that can be used for further oppression. This model needs to 
be criticised more openly.  
Bakhtin’s concept of carnival goes much further than literary criticism. It is a 
model for a social, cultural and political revolution. I argue that Bakhtin’s carnivalesque, 
when taken too far, causes novelistic discourse to generate signs without reference, which 
leads to a collapse of meaning. In short, to study carnival is to examining how a model of 
revolution and meaning making fails. By figuring out why it, we may also learn what it 
takes for such a model to succeed.  
 
Structure and tasks:  
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Following this general introduction, this work will proceed to one chapter of further 
introduction to its topic, followed by four more chapters of analysis.  
The first chapter aims to delimit the topic of this thesis, briefly introduce 
Bakhtin’s work in which the objects of analysis appear, as well as include a short 
biographical overview to suggest that Bakhtin’s academic interests may have been 
influenced by personal motivations. This chapter will also explain Bakhtin’s style, define 
the concepts that are the objects of this analysis, and introduce their inner structural 
contradictions; the aim is to define and explain the evolution of the Bakhtinian concepts I 
will discuss in this work: the novel, the epic, carnival and the carnivalesque. 
The following three chapters analyse The Name of the Rose as a critique of the 
four Bakhtinian concepts introduced in the first chapter. Chapter two gives an overview 
of the semiotic context of Eco’s novel, as well as my methodology for the close reading, 
and will explain the reason for using binary oppositions as the main focus of the analysis. 
Chapter three has two principal aims: to identify and list the carnivalesque binary 
oppositions in the novel, and to explain Eco’s views on carnival as shown in his 
deconstruction of the tragedy/comedy binary opposition. The fourth chapter identifies 
these views by showing examples of deconstructions and carnivals within the novel. In 
the fifth and final chapter, I aim to address the relationship between the novelistic and 
unlimited semiosis, as well as the place of reference in a purely novelistic setting. Lastly, 
I will propose a new way to systematise Bakhtin’s concepts of epic and novel without the 
use of binary oppositions. A general conclusion will restate the themes and conclusions 
discussed in the work.  
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Defining the Research Object: the novelistic and the 
carnivalesque 
 
1.1 Bakhtin’s aesthetics, genres and concepts 
 
As a person, Mikhail Bakhtin is somewhat of an eccentric, and his writings have a very 
specific style and personality. As a theorist, Bakhtin’s work does not strictly fit the 
categories of literary or cultural criticism. Often his literary concepts cross over to the 
field of cultural studies, and Bakhtin firmly believes that literature is inseparable from 
culture (Bruhn and Lundquist 2001: 22). Therefore, he has a tendency to repeat himself 
on different levels of analysis, explaining a concept in its literary context, then applying 
the concept again in a cultural context. The American Bakhtin scholar Michael Holquist 
write, in his introduction to The Dialogic Imagination, that  “[…] Bakhtin’s motivating 
idea is in its essence opposed to any strict formalisation” (Holquist 1981: xviii); Todorov 
sees this as a weakness, and Holquist believes it is because other language theorists tend 
to be more organised by comparison; for instance, 
“It may be said Jakobson works with poetry because he has a Pushkinian love of order; 
Bakhtin, on the contrary, loves novels because he is a baggy monster” (Holquist 1981: 
xviii). However, what Bakhtin does have in his work is “an almost Manichean sense of 
opposition and struggle” in his concept of language, which is present in both culture and 
(Holquist 1981: xviii). I believe this causes the problem in his methodology, but before 
jumping to discussing specific problems, it would be useful to note that there is a 
particular way to read and tame this “baggy monster”. 
It may be useful to note that instead of making accurate claims, Bakhtin sets up 
systems of terms, and makes his points in the relations between elements in his systems, 
rather than on the elements themselves. Sometimes he makes very general claims about 
history or literary theory when attempting to describe a very abstract idea, but since these 
are difficult to put into words, he describes them using concrete names as placeholders. 
To a new reader, his claims may sound like heavily generalised historical statements that 
cannot be proven, and sound too extreme to be accurate, but they make more sense after 
one disregards specific nouns and thinks of them as placeholders for very general or 
abstract phenomena. For instance, his essay From the prehistory of novelistic discourse 
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claims that polyglossia came from Rome, which used three languages (Bakhtin 1981: 63), 
and that Roman laughter developed from Hellenic polyglossia that originated in the 
Orient (Bakhtin 1981: 63). From a historical point of view, this claim is vague and makes 
little sense, but remove the proper nouns, and it becomes clearer that thematically, 
Bakhtin is simply describing a cultural crossroads in which meeting points result in 
dialogue. Hellenistic culture was cosmopolitan, and included voices from various ethno-
linguistic, political, social and occupational backgrounds; and later the Romans inhabited 
a cosmopolitan cultural space as well. “Hellenistic” and “Roman” are proper noun 
placeholders, and Bakhtin’s point is not to describe language usage in two classical 
empires, but to vaguely make a connection between cultural openness and laughter.  
Although Bakhtin writes academic works, what stands out the most to me is his 
aesthetic; he writes about forms that are jumbled up and stuck together, playful, parodic, 
irreverent and loud, evoking medieval festivals at their most vulgar and festive. His style 
matches his content, full of long, passionate and rhetorical sentences, obscure allusions 
and generalisations that are extreme and seemingly arbitrary. Bakhtin does not stress the 
accuracy of his details, instead focusing on creating open, dynamic systems involving 
concepts that directly relate to one another. His literary concepts have direct counterparts 
in his cultural concepts, and one can view Bakhtin’s later works as additional layers built 
on top of his earlier works, sometimes transgressing the previous ones’ genre.  
Despite dedicating my work to criticising his, I recognise that Bakhtin’s writing is 
valuable because it so vividly expresses what had been previously missing in literary and 
cultural theory: a model of a living and constantly-evolving genre comprised of a 
plurality of voices; and in cultural theory, a model of a culture in which different social, 
occupational and political discourses engage in dialogue with each other as equals, 
without the interference of an authority figure.  
Bakhtin’s later concepts of novel and the novelistic, heteroglossia and carnival 
began in Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, where he introduced the concept of the 
polyphonic novel. This work begins by stating that  
 
Any acquaintance with the voluminous literature on Dostoevsky leaves the impression that one is 
dealing not with a single author-artist, […] but a number of philosophical statements by several 
author-thinkers—Raskolnikov, Myshkin, Stavrogin, Ivan Karamazov, the Grand Inquisitor, and 
others. (Bakhtin 1993: 5)  
 19 
 
According to Bakhtin, “Dostoevsky […] created a fundamentally new novelistic genre” 
(1993: 7) in which each of his characters, instead of being “an object of authorial 
discourse”, is a “fully valid, autonomous carrier of his own individual world” (Bakhtin 
1993: 5).  
After Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics, Bakhtin and his colleagues were arrested 
and sentenced to ten years of hard labour in Siberia. Bakhtin was able to appeal his 
sentence, since earlier in 1983 Bakhtin suffered a bone disease that later led to the 
amputation of his leg. Therefore, instead of the prison camps, Bakhtin went into exile for 
six years in Kustanai (Qostanay), Kazakhstan. He was relatively prolific during this 
period, during which the Great Terror, particularly the Yezhovshchina would have made 
it dangerous for him to publish. Bakhtin’s writings after these repressions concern literary 
and culture openness, and seem to remove characteristics of Dostoevsky's polyphonic 
novel out of its specific context, placing them into the broader context of novels and even 
culture in general. The philosopher Simon Critchley believes Bakhtin's focus on openness 
in his later work is 
 [...] not incidental […] to the circumstances of composition and indirect intention of Bakhtin’s 
Rabelais and his World  […] written in 1941, just a few years after the height of the Stalinist 
purges […] Bakhtin’s defence of what he calls ‘grotesque realism’, his praise of ‘comic 
heteroglossia’, of unofficial culture, of the unruliness of the body and the identification of the 
latter with the ‘collective ancestral ground of the people’, is clearly an implied critique of the 
official culture and hierarchy of Stalinism and its aesthetics of social realism. (Critchley 2002: 82). 
 
Epic and novel: Towards a methodology for the study of the novel was presented in 1941, 
and in this essay, Bakhtin describes the novel in general as a polyphonic work, not only 
the ones written by Dostoevsky.  
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1.2 The novel and the novelistic 
 
As in the case of Dostoevsky’s novels in particular, Bakhtin’s general notion of ‘novel’ is 
not merely a fictional prose narrative divided into chapters. ‘Novel’ refers to a work of 
protean form due to its containing more than one inner structure (Bakhtin 1981: 5). These 
inner structures, each of which represents a discourse, are artistically arranged into a 
unified work that nevertheless is free of an overarching authoritative voice, so that each 
discourse represented in the novel is validated as much as the others (Bakhtin 1981: 262). 
Again, as with Dostoevsky’s novels, this newly generalised notion of “novel” contains a 
multitude of voices spanning various social, political and occupational backgrounds. 
Thus, “The language of the novel is a system of languages that mutually and 
ideologically interanimate each other. It is impossible to describe and analyse it as a 
single unitary language” (Bakhtin 1981: 47). 
In addition, Bakhtin notes that the inclusion of multiple voices within the novel 
generates metalanguage when the different layers of discourse communicate among 
themselves. As these layers become 
 
 […] more free and flexible, […] permeated with laughter, irony, humour, elements of self-parody 
[…] the novel inserts into these other genres an indeterminancy, a certain semantic openness, a 
living contract with unfinished, still-evolving contemporary reality (the openended present)” 
(Bakhtin 1981: 7). 
 
In other words, the novel’s openness makes it the best literary genre for modelling reality 
(Bakhtin 1981: 7), which Bakhtin imagines “to be something like an immense novel” 
(Bakhtin 1981: 60). While Bakhtin’s notion of “novel” can be applied to fictional prose 
narratives, he does not limit its use to literary criticism alone. Instead, the novel as a 
literary genre demonstrates the description of “novelistic”, which can refer to anything 
characterised by openness and a mix of discourses, including culture, festivals and even 
bodies. Bakhtin writes that “Studying other genres is analogous to studying dead 
languages; studying the novel, on the other hand, is like studying languages that are not 
only alive, but still young” (1981: 3). Therefore, cultures and forms that acknowledge 
their own evolution may be described as novelistic.  
Bakhtin contrasts the novel against the epic, which speaks with a single authorial 
voice that dominates the entire work. He describes the epic as an “absolutely completed 
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and finished generic form” (1981: 13–14), in contrast to the novel, which “is determined 
by experience” (1981: 15).  Since the epic contains only one voice, and therefore only 
one level of discourse, it lacks the capacity for metalanguage. The epic voice cannot be 
an equal among many others in a conversation, because the work contains no other voices 
with which it can converse. Set in the absolute past, it speaks to its audience through a 
vast temporal distance, and  “[…] precisely because it is walled off from all subsequent 
times, the epic past is absolute and complete. It is closed as a circle; inside it everything 
is finished, already over” (Bakhtin 1981: 16).  
If “[…] tradition isolates the world of the epic from personal experience, from any 
new insights, from any personal initiative in understanding and interpreting, from new 
points of view and evaluations” (Bakhtin 1981: 16), then the epic speaks to a purely 
receptive audience. The reader is not given room to participate (interpret) in the epic 
world if epic distance makes the epic’s voice sacred and unquestioned. In short, the epic 
is the authoritarian opposite of the novel. 
 
1.3 Carnival and the carnivalesque 
 
Bakhtin first introduces carnival as an extra-literary concept in Problems of Dostoevsky’s 
Poetics, explaining that “Carnival itself […] is not, of course, a literary phenomenon” 
(1993: 122), but rather a literary or social context that is “the place for working out […] a 
new mode of interrelationship between individuals” (1993: 123).  
Rabelais and his World goes further in its exploration of carnival, tracing its roots 
to the Feast of Fools, in the High Middle Ages, an annual festival in which Church 
officials switched social roles with the common people. In Rabelais and his World, 
Bakhtin argues that the Feast of Fools offered a brief window of social equality (Bakhtin 
1984: 10), celebrating the vernacular of the marketplace using dynamic, undefined and 
often grotesque forms, and featuring relative social equality. In other words, formal 
openness and liminality are both what Bakhtin would consider as carnivalesque 
phenomena, and carnival is the site where the novelistic discourse manifests itself. In 
fact, in Epic and novel, Bakhtin notes that novelistic discourse, originated in the 
“conversational folk language” of the marketplace (Bakhtin 1981: 50). 
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As an event, carnival celebrates the “temporary liberation from the prevailing 
truth and from the established order”, and its feasting is “the true feast of time, the feast 
of becoming, change and renewal” (Bakhtin 1984:10). Therefore, “This temporary 
suspension, both ideal and real, of hierarchical rank created during carnival time a special 
type of communication impossible in everyday life” (Bakhtin 1984: 10). In other words, 
carnival is a brief interruption of accepted social roles. However, Bakhtin appears to 
contradict himself because whereas “becoming, change and renewal” suggests a state of 
continuous liminality and unlimited growth, a “temporary liberation” suggests a one-time 
transgression determined by the norm that is transgressed.  
Initially (in Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics), carnival is merely descriptive, but 
in Rabelais and his World, the novelistic world of carnival forms a contrast against the 
epic world of the Church. Bakhtin writes that,  
 
An intolerant, one-sided tone of seriousness is characteristic of official medieval culture. The very 
contents of medieval ideology—asceticism, somber providentialism, sin, atonement, suffering, as 
well as the character of the feudal regime, with its oppression and intimidation—all these elements 
determined this tone of icy seriousness. It was supposedly the only tone fit to express the true, the 
good, and all that was essential and meaningful. Fear, religious awe, humility, these were the 
overtones of this seriousness. (Bakhtin 1984: 73)  
 
This description is reminiscent of epic distance, which on this cultural level of analysis is 
called the “official” culture of the Church. Carnival mocks hallmarks of the epic genre, 
seeking to degrade discourses made sacred by epic distance, bringing them down to earth 
and exposing them to dialogue (Bakhtin 1984: 24). Bakhtin believes that degradation is 
significant for challenging “the extreme expression of narrow-mindedness and stupid 
seriousness [of authoritarian discourse], which is defeated by laughter” (Bakhtin 1984: 
47). It is in Rabelais and his World that Bakhtin most clearly presents epic and novel as 
antagonistic concepts, siding with the novel; we have seen earlier in Epic and novel that 
he believes the novel to be a more accurate representation of the world. In Rabelais and 
his World, takes this idea even further, claiming that the true nature of the world is 
laughter (1984: 9). 
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1.4 Problems of the carnivalesque 
 
Initially, the concepts ‘epic’ and ‘novelistic’ both describe literary genres. In a novel, the 
epic voice would be reduced to one dialect among many others, losing its authority when 
put into dialogue with other, equally important voices also present in the same work, 
depriving it of the epic distance which lends it its authority. A novel can potentially 
absorb the epic voice and add it to its layers of discourse. As an ever-growing collection 
of voices, the novel does not have boundaries to transgress. The problem starts with the 
carnivalesque in Rabelais and his World, where the novelistic becomes characterised as 
the model of openness set against the epic voice, where its goal becomes not to grow, but 
to oppose the epic voice, which can be represented in medieval European society by 
 
Aristotelian poetics, the poetics of Augustine, the poetics of the medieval church, of “the one 
language of truth” […] they serve one and the same project of centralising and unifying the 
European languages. The victory of one reigning language (dialect) over the others, the 
supplanting of languages, their enslavement, the process of illuminating them with the True Word, 
the incorporation of barbarians and the lower strata into a unitary language of culture and truth 
[…] (Bakhtin 1981: 271). 
 
It matters to note that by “languages”, Bakhtin does not refer to the local use of grammar 
and vocabulary, but “language as a world view, even as a concrete opinion”, and the ‘one 
language of truth’ is any language that believes itself to be the basis for “sociopolitical 
and cultural centralisation” (Bakhtin 1981: 271). 
In the carnivalesque model of culture, representatives of novelistic openness (the 
comedic and vernacular, the marketplace) in the epic/novel binary pair are treated as 
somehow truer and better than the closedness of epic. These peripheral, novelistic 
discourses seek to break free from authoritarian discourse by directly opposing it. Yet the 
side that seeks to transgress depends on the other side to make rules that they can 
transgress. Instead of being reduced to a mere dialect, the authoritarian side is 
acknowledged in every one of their broken rules. By defining itself as the binary opposite 
of the epic side, the novelistic side depends on it for its very own identity.  
If Bakhtin’s concepts on the novelistic side promote political autonomy, and to be 
free to grow without being stunted by rigid boundaries, it is a problem if this open, 
novelistic culture is dependent on its complete opposite. In a true binary opposition, one 
side is never free of the other. While there is nothing wrong with the purely descriptive 
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use of binary opposites, something is wrong in carnival, when one side wants to leave 
while trapped in a structure that will not let it leave.  
On the literary level, ‘epic’ and ‘novel’ are both descriptive concepts. They are 
not part of a binary opposition because novel absorbs the epic voice as one of its many 
artistically stratified voices; however, the carnivalesque first places these two concepts 
into a binary opposition that operates on the following levels: 
• On the social/cultural level: Church vs. marketplace 
• On the ideo-linguistic level: Latin vs. vernaculars 
• In socio/cultural semiotics: centre vs. peripheries 
Derrida notes that Western metaphysics usually favours the first term in a binary 
opposition (Derrida 1982: 21, 28); in this case, Church, Latin and centre all dominate 
their more peripheral opposites. After Bakhtin’s carnivalesque emphasises the opposition 
between the two terms of the binary, it then switches the traditional order of dominance. 
Therefore, the carnivalesque favours the marketplace, vernaculars and peripheries, 
believing these sides to be more reflexive of reality, as well as key to social and political 
autonomy. However, in a binary opposite, each side is a mirror reflection of the other, 
and each side defines itself through its difference from the other. Therefore by opposing 
epic discourse in a binary opposition, novelistic discourse actually confirms it, 
unwittingly becoming a proponent for authoritarianism.  
 It should be noted that Derrida’s binary oppositions could consist of any pair of 
opposites, but Bakhtin’s carnival concerns only the binary oppositions that derive from 
epic/novelistic aesthetics, or in a social context, centre/peripheries. Other binary 
oppositions used by Lévi-Strauss and Derrida, such as male/female, sun/moon, 
speech/writing and presence/absence are of little to no relevance to Bakhtin’s concept of 
carnival. Carnival only seeks to overturn the opposition between a unified ruling voice 
and the voices it speaks above, therefore its binary oppositions involve an element or 
discourse belonging to a firmly-established social centre matched against an element or 
discourse of the social peripheries. That which can be described as carnivalesque inverts 
the familiar order of binary oppositions, and carnival is the event of inversion itself.  
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1.5 Conclusion: Bakhtin as an explicit voice in his works 
 
Bakhtin’s most famous concept is the ‘novel’, which he characterises as a unified work 
containing a plurality of voices from a variety of social, historical and occupational 
backgrounds, each promoting its own discourse. The novel artistically stratifies these 
voices into dialogue, therefore the voices in a novel are equally important, and their 
interdependency (for dialogue) allows them equal validity in the eyes of the author. 
Although Bakhtin first noticed this particular structure in the polyphonic novels of 
Dostoevsky, later on, his study of the polyphonic novel evolves into a theory of novels in 
general. Eventually the description ‘novelistic’ expands into Bakhtin’s cultural theories 
as well; that is, a novelistic culture would contain a variety of discourses from voices of 
different social, historical and occupational backgrounds, none of them privileged above 
the others.  
When Bakhtin wrote his general theory of the novel, he also defined his concept 
of the epic, a literary form that is the complete opposite of the novel in its containing only 
one voice, which dominates the entire artistic work. When Rabelais and his World places 
the novelistic into a cultural context, corresponding it with the culture of the marketplace, 
the description of the epic extends into a cultural description as well. In Bakhtin’s culture 
theory, the epic describes the solemn, authoritarian culture of the Catholic Church intent 
on maintain its political, social and cultural dominance, while the description of 
novelistic characterises the marketplace, a world consisting of people from a variety of 
social, economic and occupational backgrounds.  
Bakhtin’s concept of carnival is derived from the Feast of Fools, a festival in 
which the people of the marketplace mock the figures and rituals of the Church, or the 
cultural centre. It refers to the switching of places between components of a binary 
opposition. Therefore, the carnivalesque refers to an agonistic relationship between 
Bakhtin’s earlier descriptions of the epic and novelistic (central and peripheral 
discourses) in a binary opposition, in which the novelistic (peripheral) discourses are 
favoured over the epic (the authoritative centre). Carnival has an inconsistent inner 
structure: by placing epic and novel in a binary opposition, the terms become mutually 
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dependent, but at the same time, carnival pushes for the novelistic to be independent 
from, as well as dominant over the central epic discourse of its given culture.  
My reason for using this entire work to criticise the consistency of Bakhtin’s ideas is 
that his methodology defeats his intention to model a dynamic culture. Bakhtin’s work 
has a consistent aesthetic (people from different backgrounds mixing in the marketplace, 
laughter bordering on vulgarity, medieval folk festivals), and progresses from being 
descriptive to argumentative. ‘Novel’ and ‘epic’ lose their neutrality as Bakhtin develops 
his thesis on carnival, which places these two concepts in a binary opposition. However, 
Bakhtin advocates for the carnivalesque; that is, perhaps due to his personal experiences 
against the historical background of his time, Bakhtin sincerely believes that the 
peripheral, or novelistic discourses should dominate over the central, or epic discourse in 
culture. Yet due to the nature of the binary opposite, neither side can win. By using the 
binary model in his cultural theory, Bakhtin guarantees that his dream of a dynamic, open 
culture depends on an authoritarian culture in order to validate its own existence. 
Conversely, the authoritarian culture depends on its ability to marginalise the 
marketplace—that is, the peripheral discourse in order to validate its own existence. A 
culture cannot free itself from an authority figure by depending on it. Bakhtin 
passionately puts forth a model, but sabotages it with his own methodology. 
Bakhtin’s writing combines rhetorical and academic styles, includes references and 
allusions to other works; and responds to other voices, particularly that of François 
Rabelais. Yet his writing is far from novelistic, because Bakhtin’s own voice dominates 
the work. In spite of his praise for the use of multiple, equally important voices in a 
single work, Bakhtin does not leave his own words open to interpretation: he is very 
insistent on promoting novelistic discourse. In other words, in order to make his 
argument clear and free of ambiguity, Bakhtin relies on the authority of the epic voice in 
his work. This is an important point that I will refer back to in the final chapter, after first 
exploring the implications and problem of carnival.  
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2. The Name of the Rose in a Bakhtinian context 
2.1 Aims, materials and methodology of the analysis 
 
The previous chapter stated the problem, which is that Bakhtin’s concept of the 
carnivalesque places his concepts of the epic and novel in a binary opposition, causing 
each to depend on the other, while simultaneously believing that this arrangement allows 
the novel to be free of the epic. My primary aim in this chapter is to show that Umberto 
Eco’s novel The Name of the Rose can be used as an illustration to explore how the 
carnivalesque model structurally contradicts itself.  
The Name of the Rose was first published in Italian in 1980, and the English 
translation by William Weaver was published in 1983. For this analysis, I will be using 
the 1984 edition, which includes the supplemental essay Postscript to The Name of the 
Rose. 
While it is unlikely that Eco wrote his novel as a direct response to Bakhtin, what 
stood out to me was that The Name of the Rose has a distinctly carnivalesque aesthetic: 
Eco contrasts the vernacular world of the medieval marketplace against the solemn and 
dignified world of the Church. There are some grotesque characters, descriptions of wild 
feasting and revelry, a protagonist who consistently expresses his disdain for political and 
religious authority figures, and multiple voices from both dominant and peripheral 
discourses. Since this is a very specific aesthetic, I kept the possible link between The 
Name of the Rose and Bakhtin’s carnival in mind, and eventually, Eco’s short essay The 
frames of comic ‘freedom’ in Carnival!, Sebeok’s 1984 anthology, confirmed that Eco 
had indeed given thought to carnival and the carnivalesque:  
The idea of carnival has something to do with comic. So, to clarify the definition of carnival it would 
suffice to provide a clear-cut definition of comic. Unfortunately, we lack such a definition. From 
antiquity to Freud or Bergson, every attempt to define comic seems to be jeopardised by the fact that 
this is an umbrella term [...] that gathers together a disturbing ensemble of diverse and not completely 
homogenous phenomena such as humour, comedy, grotesque, parody, satire, wit, and so on. (Eco 
1984b: 1) 
 
A deeper look shows that The Name of the Rose can be read, among other things, 
as a critique to Bakhtin; in fact, the novel provides a context in which Bakhtin’s carnival 
plays out—and collapses in on itself. Like Bakhtin, the protagonist William of 
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Baskerville champions a novelistic culture, but does so by dividing the discourses around 
him into the central and peripheral.  
William divides much of the debates and cultural phenomena around him into binary 
oppositions consisting of a centre against its peripheral opposites. William believes that 
supporting the peripheral side will help to promote an open, novelistic culture free of the 
authoritarian voice. In the later chapters of the novel, a few of these binary oppositions 
deconstruct, revealing its two sides to be the same as each other, so that by supporting the 
peripheral side of a binary, William unknowingly supports the central, epic and 
authoritarian side at the same time.  
 My analysis consists of a close reading of Eco’s novel not as historical reference, but 
as an example or illustration that exposes why Bakhtin’s idea of the carnivalesque is 
structurally flawed. I will point out William’s binary oppositions within the novel, and 
indicate how these correspond to the fundamental epic/novel opposition at the heart of 
Bakhtin’s carnival.  
While working on this task, I noticed that The Name of the Rose also gives some 
insights into Bakhtin’s concept of the novel. Therefore, a secondary of this chapter is to 
indicate that the idea of novelistic discourse being independent from epic is flawed in a 
different way that has nothing to do with binary oppositions. Each voice in the novel is its 
own authoritative voice; in other words, the novel contains many epic voices in dialogue 
with each other. In Discourse in the novel, Bakhtin writes that “The language in a poetic 
work realises itself as something about which can be no doubt, something that cannot be 
disputed, something all-encompassing” (Bakhtin 1981: 286). While each voice in the 
novel is authoritative in that it does not invite dispute regarding its specific referents (in a 
dialogue, the listener may interpret the speaker’s intentions without questioning each 
word being said), it is not necessarily “all-encompassing”, due to being challenged by 
other subjectively authoritative voices that keeps it in dialogue. Bakhtin’s concepts of 
novel and epic do depend on each other, but they are not binary opposites. 
 
Since my aim is to critically analyse Bakhtin’s carnivalesque using Eco’s novel, the 
majority of my references will come from the primary sources. To avoid extrapolation, I 
will work mostly closely with The Dialogic Imagination, Rabelais and his World (the 
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works in which Bakhtin discusses the concepts of novel, epic and carnival) and The 
Name of the Rose. My main secondary sources are Eco’s short essay The frames of comic 
‘freedom’, in which he clarifies his views on the arguments implied in The Name of the 
Rose. In addition, I will refer to Art and Beauty in the Middle Ages, Eco’s short historical 
overview of medieval aesthetics, which summarises the nonfictional historical 
background of The Name of the Rose, including historical debates that inspired the ones 
in his novel. It can be seen as a reader’s guide to the historical inspiration behind his 
novel.  
My two primary sources for the analysis are Eco’s The Name of the Rose and The 
frames of comic ‘freedom’. Related concepts, such as comedy and tragedy will be 
mentioned as well, yet since this work is about Bakhtin’s theories as illustrated by Eco, I 
will not focus on these comedy and tragedy. Therefore, in the subchapter on comedy I 
will mostly reference Eco’s essay (The frames), because the point is not to write about 
comedy, but Eco’s idea of comedy as it appears in his novel. I also include Eco’s 
nonfictional historical overview of medieval aesthetics (Art and Beauty in the Middle 
Ages) as a secondary source to show that Eco’s characters can stand in for different sides 
of historical debates. Some of the voices and arguments in The Name of the Rose appear 
to correspond to historical figures; for instance, the abbot Abo’s love of art and material 
wealth to express allegorical meanings recalls the philosophy of Suger of St. Denis 
(1081–1151), and Jorge of Burgos’ arguments—even their style—against parody and the 
inclusion of imaginary creatures in allegorical works strongly evoke those of Bernard of 
Clairvaux (1090–1153). 
The purpose of this work is not to examine how epics, novels, carnival, tragedy 
and comedy relate to any general literary or historical context. I should clarify that the 
aim here is not to show that how Bakhtin’s concept of carnival fit into a broader literary 
context, but to explain why it fails in the context of his own work. To state this point, I 
will interpret The Name of the Rose as a commentary on the Bakhtinian carnival. 
Whether this is part of Eco’s intention is unclear; however, in the Postscript to The Name 
of the Rose, he writes that “The text is there, and produces its own effects of sense […] 
The author should die once he has finished writing. So as not to trouble the path of the 
text” (Eco 1984a: 507–508). 
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2.2 Historical background and semiotic context 
 
In the sixth century CE, Benedict of Nursia’s monastic reforms popularised the 
expression of Christian scriptures using allegory (Clark 2011: 238). One purpose of this 
mediation was to make scriptures more accessible to the common people, until “pictures 
were the literature of the laity” (Eco 2002: 54). Expressing scripture through stained glass 
images increased symbol usage in the medieval Church, as symbols “…were able to 
articulate qualities that theory could not…they could make intelligible those doctrines 
which proved irksome in their more abstract form” (Eco 2002: 54). Sometimes symbolic 
representation happened organically, because “…unsophisticated persons found it easy to 
convert their beliefs into images” (Eco 2002: 54), but in the High Middle Ages, members 
of the clergy also created a vocabulary of image-based symbols, each linked with a 
specific and unchanging referent4.  
Among Benedict’s reforms was the requirement for every monastery to maintain 
a book collection, so in the centuries that followed, monasteries turned into bookmaking 
factories and trade networks (Clark 2011: 238). The growth of libraries coincided with 
the rise of allegory among laypersons; in addition, allegories entered into writing as well, 
and as monks moved away from literal readings of scripture, they no longer saw signs as 
obstacles to the referent, but as supplements in understanding it more deeply, by seeing it 
in surprising ways (Eco 2002: 57). In The Name of the Rose, for example, the fictional 
Adelmo of Otranto illustrated humorous marginalia, much like many of his historical 
counterparts. Meanwhile, monasteries gained more political power as Christianity 
became more firmly defined as the dominant discourse in Western Europe, and therefore 
the monasteries were able to afford libraries, illuminated manuscripts, relics and 
reliquaries and other displays of wealth.  
After Benedict’s reform, monasteries not only produced new books, but collected 
existing ones as well, and since at the time there were not enough Christian books to 
circulate through an entire library system, pre-Christian books as well as their Arabic 
translations and commentaries also found their way into these libraries. The fictional 
                                                
4 Some images had two referents; for example, the snake represented both prudence and Satan (Eco 2002: 
56). However, the referents for each sign are conventional and predetermined. Allegories did not 
spontaneously change their referents. 
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abbey in The Name of the Rose restricted access to its library, so its books were not 
widely read or circulated, but instead kept locked so and their value consisted mainly in 
adding to the abbey’s wealth.  
However, in nonfictional abbeys over time, the contents of these Benedictine 
libraries were read. Scriptural texts lost their former authority when monks engaged them 
in conversation through their commentaries, and some conservatives resented what they 
thought as the increased secularisation of the Church. In addition, the High Middle Ages 
saw knowledge open to cathedral schools, and later to universities, effectively ending the 
monastery’s monopoly on academic writing. The Name of the Rose takes place during 
this scholastic shift. 
The novel is set in 1327 during an investigation of heresy in a Benedictine abbey. 
A former inquisitor, the Franciscan William of Baskerville, arrives with his Benedictine 
novice Adso of Melk to investigate; however, William spends most of his stay acting as a 
detective in order to solve a series of apparent murders. William’s investigation tools 
include cutting edge (for the time) applications of Aristotelian logic and syllogism, a 
knowledge of herbs courtesy of Abbasid scholarship, and tools such as astrolabes and 
eyeglasses that the Benedictines around him have, for the most part, never before 
encountered.  
 The two professional investigations correspond with William’s personal crisis. As 
an inquisitor, William had been disappointed in his unsuccessful quest for a universal 
truth. Having discovered that political and religious authorities create arbitrary social and 
cultural distinctions to keep themselves in power, William begins to discredit the 
dominant discourse. Throughout his stay at the abbey, William questions Benedictine 
traditions (such the abbey’s restricting access to their library), mocks displays of material 
wealth, engages in dangerous debates about heresy and teaches his young novice to be 
sceptical of authority figures in general. As a Franciscan, William finds the Benedictines 
old-fashioned and their displays of wealth out-dated. William shows strong enthusiasm 
for the apparent cultural openness of scholasticism. 
It is implied that William himself may have been accused of heresy had he not 
enjoyed the protection of his social rank as a former inquisitor. It is ironic that William’s 
reputation as an authority figure grants him the safety and relative freedom to criticise 
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authority figures. In addition, William is somewhat of a revolutionary, and his interest in 
scholasticism and dialectic goes hand in hand with a disdain for Benedictine tradition, 
from its use of closed, mono-referential allegories to its material displays of wealth. 
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2.3 Polyphony in the novel  
 
Some characters in The Name of the Rose have historical counterparts, and the novel 
contains two voices from historical debates on aesthetics: the abbot Abo, whose love of 
allegorically justified wealth recalls the historical abbot Suger of St. Denis (1081–1151), 
and Jorge of Burgos, the blind former librarian who, when discussing allegory and 
parody, makes arguments that recall the historical Bernard of Clairvaux (1090–1153) in 
both style and content. In addition, William, whose arguments recall those of Bakhtin. 
The polyphony of Eco’s novel is significant for allowing its discourses to express 
themselves, independent of an author’s agendum or overarching voice. In this particular 
case, polyphony allows Bakhtin’s concept of the carnivalesque (represented by William) 
the opportunity to take a test run in a cultural context, unaided by the author. Applying 
the carnivalesque in the context of the novel is enough to reveal its inner contradiction; 
however, this is only possible if the novel itself is unbiased. Polyphonic novels, by giving 
equal validity to the voices in their narrative, ensure a necessary degree of neutrality.  
 
In Art and Beauty in the Middle Ages, Eco characterises Suger as a  “medieval man of 
taste and the art lover” (Eco 2002: 13). Suger had a certain fondness for jewels, and filled 
the treasury at St. Denis with “[…] the sardius, the topaz, and the jasper, the chrysolite, 
and the onyx, the beryl, the sapphire, and the carbuncle, and the emerald” (Eco 2002: 13). 
He describes a nearly mystical pleasure in contemplating jewels: 
 
Thus, when—out of my delight in the beauty of the house of God—the loveliness of the many-
coloured gems that has called me away from external cares, and worthy mediation has induced me 
to reflect, transferring that which is material to that which is immaterial, on the diversity of the 
sacred virtues: then it seems to me that I see myself dwelling, as it were, in some strange region of 
the universe which neither exists entirely in the slime of the earth nor entirely in the purity of 
Heaven; and that, by the grace of God, I can be transported from this inferior to that higher world 
in an anagogical manner. (Eco 2002: 14, quoting Suger) 
 
In The Name of the Rose, Abo repeats Suger’s words almost verbatim: 
 
“As I take pleasure in all the beauties of this house of God, when the spell of the many-colored 
stones has torn me from outside concerns and a worthy meditation has led me to reflect, 
transferring that which is material to that which is immaterial, on the diversity of the sacred 
virtues, then I seem to find myself, so to speak, in a strange region of the universe, no longer 
completely enclosed in the mire of the earth or completely free in the purity of heaven. And it 
seems to me that, by the grace of God, I can be transported from this lower world to that higher 
world by anagoge….” (Eco 1984a: 144) 
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In the novel, Abo appears to justify his enjoyment of gems by discussing their allegorical 
uses: 
 
The riches you see […] and others you will see later, are the heritage of centuries of piety and 
devotion, testimony to the power and holiness of this abbey. Princes and potentates of the earth, 
archbishops and bishops have sacrificed to this altar and to the objects destined for it rings of their 
investiture, the gold and precious stones that were the emblem of their greatness, to have them 
melted down here to the greater glory of the Lord and of this His place. (Eco 1984a: 143) 
 
However, he shows more interest and attention in the precious stones themselves rather 
than what they signify. 
 
“You recognise it, do you not? […] The symbol of my authority, but also of my burden. It is not 
an ornament: it is a splendid syllogy of the divine word whose guardian I am […] This is amethyst 
[…] which is a mirror of humility and reminds us of the ingenuousness and sweetness of Saint 
Matthew; this is chalcedony, mark of charity, symbol of the piety of Joseph and Saint James the 
Greater; this is jasper, which bespeaks faith and is associated with Saint Peter; and sardonyx, sign 
of martyrdom […]” (Eco 1984a: 447) 
 
 
Naturally there were critics, for example Bernard of Clairvaux, who feared that 
signs might distract from the referent (Eco 2002: 6), and that ornamented churches might 
prove a distracting environment for prayer. Eco characterises Suger and Bernard as 
psychological and moral opposites (Eco 2002: 13), because Suger’s attention towards 
objects that invoke immediate pleasure clashes with Bernard’s asceticism 
In addition, it was not only wealth that comprised the new media. Since parody 
had its place in the popularisation of allegory as well, often the two appeared together in 
the same statues and illuminated manuscripts. Some theologians, for instance Hugh of St. 
Victor, saw in parody an opportunity to see things in surprising ways, so that it can be 
used as a pedagogical tool.  In Art and Beauty in the Middle Ages, Eco notes that in 
addition to an allegories of art, Hugh was a proponent of an allegories of nature: 
 
Christ and His divinity were symbolised by a vast number and variety of creatures, each signifying 
His presence in a different place—in heaven, on mountain-tops, in the fields, the forests, and the 
seas. The symbols used included the lamb, the dove, the peacock, the ram, the gryphon, the 
rooster, the lynx, the palm-tree, even a bunch of grapes: a polyphony of images. (Eco 2002: 56). 
 
Hermeneutic interpretations of nature eventually gave way to parody. Some 
historical perspectives on parody make their way into Eco’s novel, when the Greek 
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scholar Venantius defends Adelmo’s use of parodic allegory, recalling a perspective from 
the historical Hugh of Foulloi (Eco 2002: 6): 
 
Adelmo took care that his art, indulging in bizarre and fantastic images, was directed nevertheless 
to the glory of God, as an instrument of knowledge of celestial things. Brother William mentioned 
just now the Areopagite, who spoke of learning through distortion. And Adelmo that day quoted 
another lofty authority, the doctor of Aquino, when he said that divine things should be expounded 
more properly in figures of vile bodies than of noble bodies…The question, in fact, was whether 
metaphors and puns and riddles, which also seem conceived by poets for sheer pleasure, do not 
lead us to speculate on things in a new and surprising way […] (Eco 1984a: 82).  
 
 
On the other hand, the historical St. Bernard of Clairvaux challenges Hugh of Foulloi’s 
side of the debate, writing, 
 
What is the point of this deformed beauty, this elegant deformity? Those loutish apes? The savage 
lions? The monstrous centaurs? Those half men? The spotted tigers? […] You can see a head with 
many bodies, or a body with many heads. Here we espy an animal with a serpent’s tail, there a fish 
with an animal’s head. There we have a beast which is a horse in front and a she-goat behind […] 
In short there is such a wondrous diversity of figures, such ubiquitous variety […] and one could 
spend the whole day marvelling at one such representation rather than meditating on the law of 
God. (Eco 2002: 7–8, quoting from Bernard’s Apologia ad Guillem, Ch. 12).  
 
Bernard’s point is that these ornaments, even if they are allegorical, distract the viewer 
from their referent. However, his critiques actually describe and cause the reader to 
visualise the clutter he purposes to hate. His style of invective is particularly vivid, 
leading Eco to conclude in his own way, Bernard appreciates the very aesthetic he 
vilifies, using his critique as an opportunity to wistfully contemplate the decorated 
churches and imaginative artworks, as his asceticism prevents him from enjoying them in 
good conscience. Eco writes that  
Ascetics, in all ages, are not unaware of the seductiveness of worldly pleasures; if anything, they 
feel it more keenly than most. The drama of ascetic discipline lies precisely in a tension between 
the call of earthbound pleasure and a striving after the supernatural. But when the discipline 
proves victorious, and brings the peace which accompanies control of the senses, then it becomes 
possible to gaze serenely upon the things of this earth, and to see their value, something that the 
hectic struggle of asceticism had hitherto prevented. (Eco 2002: 6).  
 
Bernard’s views, and even the style with which he expresses them, make their 
way into the novel when Jorge responds to Venantius: 
[…] Saint Bernard was right: little by little the man who depicts monsters and portents of nature to 
reveal the things of God per speculum et in aenigmate, comes to enjoy the very nature of the 
monstrosities he creates and to delight in them, and as a result he no longer sees except through 
them. (Eco 1984a: 80) 
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He continues,  
 
“[…] what is the meaning of those ridiculous grotesques, those monstrous shapes and shapely 
monsters? Those sordid apes? Those lions, those centaurs, those half-human creatures, with 
mouths in their bellies, with single feet, ears like sails? Those spotted tigers, those fighting 
warriors, those hunters blowing their horns, and those bodies with single heads and many heads 
with single bodies? Quadrupeds with serpents’ tails, and fish with quadrupeds’ faces, and here an 
animal who seems a horse in front and a ram behind, and there a horse with horns, and so on; by 
now it is more pleasurable for a monk to read marble than manuscript, and to admire the works of 
man than to meditate on the law of God!” […] The old man stopped, out of breath. (Eco 1984a: 
80–81). 
 
As with Eco, what stands out to Adso is Jorge’s passion, and Adso is impressed that the 
blind Jorge remembers these images so well (Eco 1984a: 81). Jorge continues his attack 
for a few more pages: 
 
Our Lord did not have to employ such foolish things to point out the straight and narrow path to 
us. Nothing in his parables arouses laughter, or fear. Adelmo, on the contrary […] took such 
pleasure in the monsters he painted that he lost sight of the ultimate things which they were to 
illustrate. And he followed all, I say all […] the paths of monstrosity (Eco 1984a: 83). 
 
William defends allegory, or more precisely, the use of signs. In his own words, 
 
God can be named only through the most distorted things. And Hugh of St. Victor reminded us 
that the more the simile becomes dissimilar, the more the truth is revealed to us under the guise of 
horrible and indecorous figures […] (Eco 1984a: 80).  
 
In this he reveals his own methodology for solving the murders: look for clues 
that point to the murder, or more broadly, look for signs that point to the truth. Until the 
very end of the book, William firmly believes in the existence of a unified truth. 
However, before events in the novel, William realised that the inquisitor’s job is not to 
find out the truth, but to keep the current authorities in power. The differentiation 
between saints and heretics is only a tool, and the power relations created by this binary 
are completely arbitrary. In his first debate with Ubertino, he says that saints and heretics 
are extremely similar, and that “…often the step between ecstatic vision and sinful frenzy 
is very brief” (Eco 1984a: 57), and “[…] there is little difference between the ardor of the 
seraphim and the ardor of Lucifer, because they are always born from an extreme igniting 
of the will” (Eco 1984a: 58). In short, William realises that there is no ontologically 
heretical belief; rather, a heresy is anything that threatens the central position of the 
currently dominant discourse. In her study of the novel, Teresa Coletti notes that heresy is 
the “semiotic containment of the margins by the centre” (Coletti 1988: 82). In William’s 
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own words, “Every battle against heresy wants only to keep the leper as he is” (Eco 
1984a: 218).  
This realisation showed William that the truth was not to be found in the epic 
(culturally centre) side of discourse, which is more interested in maintaining political 
dominance. He lost faith in the Benedictines and their allegories after seeing that the 
saint/heretic binary it constructed is empty, and the authority it helps is not necessarily 
closer to God or representative of any universal Truth. Abo’s gem collections are as 
devoid of meaning as the inquisition, and they exist not as a reflections on the ‘true’ 
nature of the world, but only show off the Benedictines’ wealth and power. William’s 
resignation as inquisitor marks his shift to the carnivalesque, from working for the centre 
to being a proponent of the cultural peripheries. He then denounces everything else that 
has to do with the epic, or central discourse, from Jorge’s seriousness and Abo’s display 
of material wealth and political power. The root of William’s investigation into laughter 
is his admiration of his order’s patron saint, Francis of Assisi (1184-1226). After losing 
his faith in the inquisition, he holds on to his faith in Francis, and by extension, in the 
peripheral side of culture. Francis himself appears as a carnivalesque figure, an eccentric 
who distrusted the dominant discourse, choosing instead to preach and practice poverty. 
William appears to especially admire how Francis used laughter to reveal the foolishness 
of existing categories, hoping to imagine a better world when these arbitrary distinctions 
that keep certain discourses in power are dissolved.  
I have already pointed out two discourses in the novel5. William is the voice of 
Bakhtin. They share a common distrust of the epic voice and things that represent it, and 
seek out a better world in that of the marketplace, of laughter.  Bakhtin believed that  
                                                
5 There are, of course, more voices than the three I pointed out in Eco’s work. For instance, Ubertino’s rant 
about secret rituals brings to mind the Les Mystères de Paris by Eugene Sue: 
 
But I learned certain things, certain things, William! They gathered at night in a cellar, they took a 
newborn boy, they threw him from one to another until he died, of blows…or other causes[…] 
They lighted candles on Easter night and took maidens into the cellar. Then they extinguished the 
candles and threw themselves on the maidens, even if they were bound to them by ties of 
blood….And if from this conjunction a baby was born, the infernal rite was resumed, all around a 
little jar of wine […] and they became drunk and would cut the baby to pieces, and pour its blood 
into the goblet […] (Eco 1984a: 59). 
 
Sue’s novel was among the plagiarised texts that comprised The protocols of the elders of Zion. Eco has 
written about vague falsehoods being taken as first-hand accounts of a minority group’s secret rituals in 
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“Laughter demolishes fear and piety before and object, before a world, making of it an 
object of familiar contact and thus clearing the ground for an absolutely freer 
investigation out of it” (Bakhtin 1981: 22). Comedy, which is rooted in folklore of the 
marketplace, demolishes epic distance (Bakhtin 1981: 22–23, 35). He divides medieval 
discourse into the sacred and profane, Church and folk, and describes parody as the 
meeting point between the two (Bakhtin 1981: 96).  
Another’s sacred word, uttered in a foreign language, is degraded by the accents of vulgar folk 
languages, re-evaluated and re-interpreted against the backdrop of these languages, and congeals 
to the point where it becomes a ridiculous image, the comic carnival mask of a narrow and joyless 
pedant, an unctuous hypocritical old bigot […] (Bakhtin 1981: 77). 
 
William thinks he can use laughter and reversals in order to see old ideas in unexpected 
ways, like Francis. He thinks his use of laughter transcends cultural codes, and is 
subversive because “laughter redeems fear; distinctions between margin and centre 
dissolve the customary rhetoric and topics of philosophy are dismantled…” (Coletti 
1988: 146). Francis deliberately worked with people on the peripheries, and William 
sides with him, especially with his sense of humour. In his book On Humour, Simon 
Critchley summarises that “By laughing at power, we expose its contingency, we realise 
that what appeared to be fixed and oppressive is in fact the emperor’s new clothes, and 
just the sort of thing that should be mocked and ridiculed.” (Critchley 2002: 11). 
It should be noted that Francis himself was not a proponent of institutionalised 
learning because he saw it as the hoarding of knowledge. Although the Church declared 
him a saint, in the novel, the only Franciscans with similar viewpoints on learning are the 
Fraticelli, Franciscan extremists and poverty enthusiasts who openly rebelled against the 
Church, and were declared heretical. Although William himself supports learning, he 
does so with the belief that learning prevents knowledge from being hoarded in the 
inaccessible libraries of monasteries, inaccessible to the common people. In fact, he 
regards learning as belonging to the common people on the peripheries. During his short 
stay at the abbey he takes the peripheral of almost every available debate, championing 
laughter, bragging about science in an age of prayer, taking the side of debates that 
                                                                                                                                            
Fictional protocols (from Six Walks in the Fictional Woods, 1994) and The power of falsehood (On 
Literature, 2002). Conspiracy theories and initiation rituals are explored in more depth in his second novel, 
Foucault’s Pendulum (1988). The point here is that there are many voices in The Name of the Rose that are 
not discussed in this thesis, such as Salvatore’s voice, Bernard Gui’s voice, Benno’s voice… 
 39 
claimed Christ laughed and was poor, and defending Adelmo’s colourful illustrations that 
do not depict anything directly holy. The point is that William is a strong proponent of 
the carnivalesque. He supports the vernacular, the comic and the peripheral precisely 
because, like Bakhtin, he knows that epic distance and authoritarianism relies on 
rhetorical devices that keep them in power, instead of the truth.  
Having said this, it is very important to show that The Name of the Rose is what 
Bakhtin would have considered a polyphonic novel, and just as Dostoevsky’s works seem 
to be written by the different philosophers Raskolnikov, Marmeladov, the Grand 
Inquisitor and etc., The Name of the Rose contains the independent viewpoints of Abo 
(Suger), Jorge (Bernard) and William (Bakhtin) in dialogue with each other. I emphasise 
this point because in a polyphonic novel, there is no authoritative voice. In this case, the 
lack of an authoritative voice shows how Bakhtin’s concepts, quite independent of the 
author, reveals its own flaws as soon as it is given a context in which it can play out. The 
novel does not control the concept, only gives it a context in which to play out and fail on 
its own. The lack of authority figure gives carnival an independence to play out on its 
own, without its success or failure being interfered with by the author’s personal agenda.  
In the postscript to the novel, Eco writes that he did not know that Jorge would 
turn out to be the murderer, and that 
He acted on his own, so to speak. And it must not be thought that this is an “idealistic” position, as 
if I were saying that the characters have an autonomous life and the author, in a kind of trance, 
makes them behave as they themselves direct them […] The fact is that the characters are obliged 
to act according to the laws of the world in which they live. (Eco 1984a: 515). 
 
 Eco does not cause William to fail in his search for a universal Truth. William 
does so himself. Once again, the polyphonic nature of the novel gives concepts the 
freedom to play out on their own. And ultimately, this is what The Name of the Rose 
manages to accomplish; Eco may not have been writing a specific critique of Bakhtin, but 
once the carnival structure is set in place, it plays out on its own to cause William’s 
failure.  
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3. Bakhtin and Eco’s definitions of carnival 
 
 3.1 Examples of the carnivalesque in The Name of the Rose 
 
The carnivalesque consists of two components: organising cultural phenomena into 
binary oppositions that correspond to epic/novelistic, and being a proponent for the 
‘novel’ side. In The Name of the Rose, William organises his world and his place in it 
into binaries; in fact, he makes his choices to correspond with the ‘novelistic’, peripheral 
and comedic side of the binary.  
I should make it clear that before resigning his post as an inquisitor, William 
successfully deconstructs the saint/heretic, or orthodoxy/heresy binary opposition. While 
explaining heresy to Adso, he notes that the inquisition regards several different 
peripheral discourses as a single voice that challenges the dominant discourse. Unlike the 
inquisitors, William chooses to recognise the variety of voices in the peripheral 
discourses considered heretical by the Church: 
The inquisitors are mistaken, rationally speaking, because they lump contradictory doctrines 
together […] The simple cannot choose their personal heresy, Adso; they cling to the man 
preaching in their land, who passes through their village or stops in their square. This is what their 
enemies exploit. To present to the eyes of the people a single heresy […] it shows the heretics as 
one jumble of diabolical contradictions which offend common sense (Eco 1984a: 200). 
 
William concludes that the Church and its inquisition use exclusion to maintain their 
dominant status in cultural discourse. However, exclusion results in the creation of more 
peripheral dissent, fuelling yet more efforts from the inquisition to suppress them: 
For centuries, as pope and emperor tore each other apart in their quarrels over power, the excluded 
went on living on the fringe, like lepers, of whom true lepers are only the illustration […] so that 
in saying ‘lepers’ we would understand ‘outcast, poor, simple, excluded, uprooted from the 
countryside, humiliated in the cities’ […] Excluded as they were from the flock, all of them were 
ready to hear, or to produce, every sermon that […] would condemn the behavior of the dogs and 
shepherds and would promise their punishment one day. The powerful always realized this. The 
recovery of the outcasts demanded reduction of privileges of the powerful, so the excluded who 
became aware of their exclusion had to be branded as heretics, whatever their doctrine. This is the 
illusion of heresy […] The faith a movement proclaims doesn’t count: what counts is the hope it 
offers. All heresies are the banner of a reality, an exclusion. Scratch the heresy and you will find a 
leper. Every battle against heresy wants only this: to keep the leper as he is. (Eco 1984a: 203) 
 
 
William’s conversion to the carnivalesque is an act of inclusion. The Church creates 
heretics in order to maintain political power. Whatever ‘Truth’ the inquisition finds is 
therefore likely to be nothing more than a practical tool for political authorities to exploit. 
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If orthodoxy/heresy is a falsehood, and working as an inquisitor is not a reliable way to 
find any sort of truth. However, William does end up continuing his search for ‘Truth’ in 
the cultural peripheries, despite knowing full well that it contains multiple and 
contradictory discourses, and that each discourse contains its own unique and 
contradictory idea of truth. It makes little sense to believe that all of these heterogeneous 
voices subscribe to any singular, universal notion of ‘Truth’. The question now is why 
William becomes a proponent of peripheral discourses. William is not particularly 
sympathetic towards accused heretics. It appears that instead of showing a true interest in 
the cultural peripheries, William simply holds a blind admiration of Saint Francis.  
 
The outcast lepers would like to drag everything down in their ruin. And they become all the more 
evil, the more you cast them out […] Saint Francis realized this, and his first decision was to go 
and live among the lepers. (Eco 1984a: 201–2 
 
 
Driven by his thirst for Truth, William suffers a truly unfortunate lapse in logic. Like the 
inquisitors, William proceeds to “lump contradictory doctrines together”. He does not 
regard separate peripheral discourses for what they are, but present them as a single 
revolt against the political scapegoating of the Church, superficially characterising the 
cultural peripheries as one jumble of anti-authoritarian voices that appeases his 
disillusionment in the inquisition. 
Therefore, although William successfully deconstructs the orthodoxy/heresy 
binary, he could not deconstruct centre/periphery, or Benedictine seriousness/Franciscan 
laughter, both of which are derivatives of Bakhtin’s central binary of epic/novelistic. 
William’s tendency towards the carnivalesque manifests in his categorising cultural 
debates and phenomena into binary oppositions, and always choosing the less culturally 
dominant side. The first part of The Name of the Rose contains several such binaries. I 
have selected the following because they are relevant to the Bakhtinian context, that is, 
they involve one side that is dominant, unified and established matched against 
something peripheral, varied and culturally new. This is characteristic of Bakhtin’s 
carnival, and the following binary oppositions illustrate it: 
 
William is a proud Franciscan among Benedictines. In the beginning of the novel, Adso 
notes that William emphasises this distinction: “[…] he replied that herbs that are good 
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for an old Franciscan are not good for a young Benedictine” (Eco 1984a: 16), and when 
Adso marvels at his ususual habit of carrying around scientific instruments, explains that 
“the Franciscans of his island were cast in another mold” (Eco 1984a: 17). Later, when 
Ubertino goes into an apocalyptic frenzy, William makes yet another dry comment about 
Franciscans: 
 
“The days of the Antichrist are finally at hand, and I am afraid, William!” He looked around, 
staring wide-eyed among the dark naves, as if the Antichrist were going to appear any moment 
[…] “It will be then that God will have to send […] so that one day they may confound the 
Antichrist, and they will come to prophesy clad in sackcloth, and they will preach penance by 
word and by example….” 
“They have already come, Ubertino,” William said, indicating his Franciscan habit”. (Eco 
1984a: 62–63) 
 
In short, William proudly distinguishes himself from the Benedictines, and at the end of 
his manuscript, Adso makes a note of this: “I pray always that God received his soul and 
forgave him the many acts of pride that his intellectual vanity had made him commit” 
(Eco 1984a: 499). 
Binaries:  Benedictine/Franciscan, local/foreign  
  
By 1327, the setting of the story, the Benedictines had been working within a well-
established Catholic society, whereas the Order of St. Francis is relatively new, has 
offshoot branches that have been declared heretical, and was founded by an eccentric 
who once preached to a wolf. In addition, William uses a variety of scientific instruments 
that most of the Benedictines have never seen (Eco 1984a: 17, 74), and likes to think that 
through science, he is reading nature as a book the same way more traditional monks read 
scripture (Eco 1984a: 24–25). William admires Thomas Aquinas and William of Ockham 
for their use of logic, and Roger Bacon for his knowledge in the natural sciences and 
engineering. Both Aquinas and Bacon’s methods are inspired by Aristotle and various 
Arab commentators who worked during the translation movement of the Abbasid 
Caliphate. Conservatives such as Ubertino are sceptical of William’s interest in 
scholasticism; in fact, near the end of their conversation, Ubertino urges William to be 
more humble about his intellect, contemplate the suffering of Christ and throw away his 
books (Eco 1984a: 63). For Ubertino, the Word of God is already complete; there is no 
need for further study and interpretation as if it were imperfect. The epic voice of 
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monasticism removes the potential for future growth within a discourse it considers to be 
complete and perfect. Learning is the admission that there is still something missing from 
the discourse. In a discourse with such rigidly closed boundaries, the pursuit of openness 
and growth is nothing less than a revolution (Bakhtin 1981: 38).  
Binaries: wealth/poverty, culture/nature, wealth/poverty, old/new, tradition/innovation, 
monastic/scholastic. 
  
The monks debate whether Christ ever laughed, and whether it is acceptable to express 
scripture in comic, parodic forms (Eco 1984a: 79-82). We have already examined the 
main arguments in a previous section, but for a clearer context, it is well to keep in mind 
that William was originally invited to the abbey in order to investigate heresy. The 
monks’ debate is relevant because if the Church admits to Christ’s laughter, and by 
extension his similarity to the common people of the marketplace, it would give credence 
to certain heretical groups that denied Christ’s divinity (Eco 2007: 49). The divine Christ 
would not have laughed because, as Jorge later explains,  
 
[…] laughter is weakness, corruption, the foolishness of our flesh. It is the peasant’s 
entertainment, the drunkard’s license […] laugher remains base, a defence for the simple, a 
mystery desecrated for the plebians […] the simple can conceive and carry out the most lurid 
heresies, disavowing the laws of God and the laws of nature (Eco 1984a: 474). 
 
Jorge concludes, “That laughter is proper to man is a sign of our limitation, sinners that 
we are” (Eco 1984a: 474), using laughter—or in this case, the lack of it—to create epic 
distance between Christ and ordinary people. In order to separate their beliefs from those 
of the heretics, the Church was obliged to argue that Christ had no need to laugh; he is 
solemn, incorruptible and divine.   
As mentioned before, William believes that comedy has God and Truth as 
referents. As for Christ, he laughed because “Nothing in his human nature forbid it” (Eco 
1984a: 95). On one occasion he tells about how St. Lawrence mocked his enemies (Eco 
1984a: 95–96), and later proudly speaks of St. Francis defacing a relic (Eco 1984a: 478). 
In Rabelais and his World, Bakhtin writes that the act of degradation brings its object 
down to earth, making it an equal among the variety of discourses in the marketplace 
(Bakhtin 1984: 14). 
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Binaries: tragedy/comedy, dignity/ridiculousness, god/human, Church/marketplace, 
orthodoxy/heresy, distance/proximity.  
 
The abbey’s library contains more books than any other in Christendom (Eco 1984a: 35), 
but while it continues to grow, Abo complains that books are beginning to be written in 
the vernacular (Eco 1984a: 36). In order to “defend the treasure of the Christian world, 
and the very word of God, as he dictated it to the prophets and to the apostles, as the 
fathers repeated it without changing a syllable” (Eco 1984a: 36–37), access to the library 
is heavily restricted. At the same time, Abo claims that the library contains “books by 
wizards, the cabalas of the Jews, the fables of the pagan poets, the lies of the infidels” 
(1984a: 37); in short, “falsehoods” too dangerous to circulate. William considers this 
restriction of access to the library to be “a great evil” (Eco 1984a: 89). In addition, Abo’s 
use of allegory differs from William’s use of signs. Whereas Abo’s allegories use a 
closed method of signification in which each sign points to only one or two specific 
referents, William believes that his use of signification is more open, in that, like 
parodies, they reveal surprising truths about the world, adding new levels of meaning 
onto existing discourse.  
Binaries: storage/circulation, hermetic/hermeneutic 
 
Up to this point we have seen examples of the carnivalesque in William’s categorisation 
of the discourses around him into elements of binary oppositions: Bakhtin’s 
epic/novelistic binary opposition is expressed as centre/periphery, or orthodoxy/heresy in 
the setting, and Benedictine seriousness/Franciscan laughter to William personally. It is 
clear that William, in his choice to support the less powerful positions in each of the 
binaries mentioned, is a proponent of the carnivalesque. However, Eco has his own views 
on binary oppositions, as well as a distinct way of characterising carnival using a 
deconstruction of tragedy/comedy. This binary opposition from classical poetics is yet 
another incarnation of the Bakhtin’s epic/novelistic opposition. Instead of supporting 
comedy, as William would have done, Eco argues that there is no rhetorical difference 
between tragedy and comedy.  
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Thus, it would be useful to interrupt the sequence of events and briefly exit the 
world of The Name of the Rose in order to explain Eco’s definition of carnival, how it 
reveals a structural contradiction of the carnivalesque, and how this contradiction fits into 
the novel as a critique of Bakhtin.  
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3.2 Eco’s definition of carnival 
 
The following is an extrapolation on The Name of the Rose using Eco’s own notes from 
The frames of comic ‘freedom’. I do not intend to say anything about tragedy or comedy 
in a general literary context, only to clarify Eco’s views on carnival in order to later 
explain how he uses this view in the novel. Here the emphasis is not on the concepts of 
tragedy and comedy themselves, but their relationship as binary opposites, and its 
relevance to carnival. In fact, Eco’s essay is about carnival (Eco 1984b: 1), but in order to 
make his point, he has to first explore the social implications of comedy, and also of 
tragedy, its binary opposite.  
It is likely that Aristotle compiled an early theory of humour in the second book 
of his Poetics, but this entire section is lost to history (Cooper 1922 :4–5). The author 
himself is unavailable to reconstruct the text, but contemporary scholars have tried to 
guess what the text might have said; for instance, in Aristotle on Comedy: Towards a 
Reconstruction of Poetics II, Richard Janko argues that the Tractatus Coilinianus is in 
fact based on Aristotle’s lost book. Eco himself does something similar after indicating 
that both tragedy and comedy fulfil the same social function, though they do this in 
completely opposite ways. Comedy is essentially tragedy turned upside-down. Eco 
explains,  
 
There is, however, one definition of comedy that seems to produce, as a side effect, a 
complementary definition of carnival: this is the one provided by the second book of Aristotle's 
Poetics. There is only a minor inconvenience: the book was either lost or was never written—an  
irreparable loss indeed. Fortunately, that which Aristotle could have said on comedy can be 
extrapolated from two sources: the observations on comedy and witty manipulation of language 
that can be found in passim in Poetics (book 1) and Rhetoric; and the post-Aristotelian Greek and 
Latin tradition, with its various more or less anonymous treatises on comedy (for instance the 
Tractatus Coislinianus) which allows us to speculate about a possible Aristotelian treatise on 
comedy. 
Following this line of thought (let me consider my attempt an exercise in the Peircean art 
of 'fair guesses' or abductions) we can outline some basic differences between tragedy and 
comedy. (Eco 1984b: 1) 
 
It is necessary to clarify that the following section discusses Eco’s exploration of comedy 
and tragedy as components of a binary opposition. The point is not to survey comedic 
forms in classical poetics, but to explain the significance of comedy in a binary 
opposition according to Eco.  
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 Tragedy  
 
In Poetics, Aristotle writes,  
“Epic poetry agrees with Tragedy in so far as it is an imitation in verse of characters of a higher 
type […] Whoever, therefore, knows what is good or bad Tragedy, knows also about Epic poetry: 
for all the elements of an Epic poem are found in tragedy, but the elements of a tragedy are not all 
found in the Epic poem. (Aristotle 1902: 22) 
  
Herodotus attributed to Solon the anecdote that those who are fortunate enough to have 
everything to lose cannot be the happiest people in the world, because they are haunted 
by the potential of future loss (Herodotus 2003: book 1, lines 31–32). A perfect member 
of society is in a similarly suspenseful situation, with the potential of losing his family, 
health, reputation and status. That this decline might be triggered by a single character 
flaw or even by fate is the tension that starts and drives the entire tragedy (Aristotle 1902: 
45).  
In classical drama, tragedies begin after the protagonist violates a social code, and 
since this code is one that most members of society respect out of habit and common 
sense, its transgression is always destabilising (Aristotle 1902: 49–51, Eco 1984b: 1-2). 
The perpetrator is very likely noble, and always sympathetic; in fact, the audience even 
identifies with the tragic hero, seeing him as an idealised version of themselves if only 
they were nobler, or better somehow (Eco 1984b: 1). Through empathy, the transgression 
plays on the audience’s anxiety of doing something socially unacceptable by accident. If 
we look at three tragic characters, Creon made a misjudgement due to one tragic flaw, 
Oedipus was a victim of fate, and Orestes found himself in a no-win situation due to bad 
luck and his parents’ mistakes. What all three have in common is their having to suffer 
disproportionate retribution. Unfortunately, Eco does not distinguish between the 
tragedies of Sophocles and those of Euripides, for instance, where there might not even 
be a single transgressive act that sets the plot in motion. However, I think his point is still 
valid, because Euripides’ plays are somewhat different in that their typically female 
protagonists do not bring about their own downfall, but they do suffer a reversal of 
fortune, and since tragedy belongs to the fatalistic Greeks, after all, it shows that even the 
best of us are fallible. The audience’s own vulnerability to fate and misjudgement 
connects them to the characters.  
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What makes tragedy enjoyable to watch is the catharsis that releases the tension 
of waiting for a perfect character to have one flaw. However, there is another side of 
catharsis; the audience may feel regret along with the hero, but also anticipates that for 
such a grave transgression, it is necessary for there to be a consequence. According to 
Eco, this second tension is relieved when the consequences appear, the transgression is 
recognised as such, and the perpetrator is punished accordingly; the rules are in place 
again, and social boundaries are restored (Eco 1984b: 1–2).  
In this light, classical tragedies are subtly authoritarian. Usually a protagonist’s 
fatal flaw or fate leads him or her to transgress social boundaries, essentially turning them 
into outsiders. In order for the audience to identify with them, they must show that they 
obey the same cultural rules, even if this means the tragic characters must accept the 
severest of consequences. In fact, remaining an outsider and unfamiliar different rules is 
not even an option6. In any case, the tension resolves not when the protagonists receive 
personal justice, but when social rules are once more in place. Anyone can suffer like a 
tragic hero, and what makes these characters particularly tragic is that they are the ones 
who have the most to lose, and their reversals of fortune are the most dramatic. 
 
Comedy 
 
Comedies are about unremarkable, clownish people7 who break minor rules (Janko 1984: 
95). Whereas tragic figures violate well known social conventions that most people 
would not dare to transgress, the rules broken by comic characters are so unusual and 
specific that most people would not think of breaking them. For instance, it is not quite 
within many known cultural norms to walk sideways on one’s hands while wearing a 
tropical mango cake for a hat, but at the same time, doing so is not strictly prohibited, not 
because such behaviour is acceptable, but because the authorities have not thought of 
prohibiting something so specifically deviant. Whereas tragic characters are made outcast 
                                                
6 There are exceptions; for example, Medea is not punished by her community. The play ends with her as 
an unrepentant outsider. However, Aristotle (1902: 51) mentions Euripides’ Medea as an example of a 
classical tragedy because its protagonist commits crimes against each and every member of close her 
family.  
7 “Comedy is, as we have said, an imitation of characters of a lower type—not, however, in the full sense of 
the word bad, the Ludicrous being merely a subdivision of the ugly. It consists in some defect or ugliness 
which is not painful or destructive. To take an obvious example, the comic mask is ugly and distorted, but 
does not imply pain” (Aristotle 1902: 21). 
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by breaking the rules they know, comedy excludes its protagonists from society for not 
knowing the social codes that are obvious to the audience. In a way, comic characters 
invent transgressions by failing to act by everyday social conventions so ingrained in the 
dominant discourse that they are usually regarded as common sense. Comedy’s trivial 
subject matter gives the audience permission to enjoy watching the buffoon stumble 
around, because the rule he breaks is so minor that it matters very little whether it is 
broken. In fact, comedy works so that the audience feels concern towards nothing, and 
rather enjoy its own disgust at the sight of the clown, mixing it with a feeling of 
superiority (Eco 1984b: 2).  
Eco writes, “What remains compulsory, in order to produce a comic effect, is the 
prohibition of spelling out the norm. It must be presupposed both by the utterer and by 
the audience. If the speaker spells it out, he is a fool or a jerk; if the audience does not 
know it, there is no comic effect (Eco 1984b: 5–6)”. Since comedy depends on the 
audience knowing something the protagonist does not know, in a sense, it depends on the 
audience’s mockery at a social outsider in order to achieve its intended effect8.  
Comedy dehumanises its protagonists, using their constant minor infractions to 
show that they cannot do anything correctly, that they are barbarian, or other, the polar 
opposite of tragic characters in that they are exactly what the audience do not want 
themselves to be. In addition, their actions or appearance are repulsive in order to prevent 
the audience from sympathising much less identifying with them. These characters make 
transgressions almost by definition of the genre, and are laughed at when there are 
disastrous results. They are “other” to begin with, and it is not that their transgression 
makes them other, but that their otherness causes the audience to expect transgressions 
from them.  
What distinguishes the catharsis of comedy from that of tragedy (Janko 1984: 95) 
is a sentimental quality that not only evokes emotion, but also complacency in the 
emotion it evokes. The point is not the model audience’s amusement and disgust, but its 
feeling of superiority in being amused and disgusted at characters seemingly worse than 
                                                
8 Classical comedies probably contained humorous as well as comedic elements. Eco examines these 
elements separately, and probably referred to comedic elements rather than classical comedies themselves. 
Therefore his “comedy” is a generalisation. His use of “tragedy” is a generalisation as well, because in The 
Trojan Women, for example, there is no transgression.  
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they are. Although Eco argues that both comedy and tragedy are similar in their 
authoritarian overtones, I believe comedy is actually more harmful because at the very 
least, tragedy unifies members of all social strata in a given society, reminding them that 
none of them are invulnerable to unfortunate twists of fate. However, comedy is divisive, 
and its message for the audience is that at least they are not like these fools. 
Eco writes that comedy “ is always racist: only the others, the Barbarians, are 
supposed to pay…Comic pleasure means enjoying the murder of the father, provided that 
others, less human than ourselves, commit the crime” (Eco 1984b: 2). While I enjoy the 
dramatic impact of his sentence, it is important to point out that in a comedy, the 
transgression must be insignificant and inconsequential to society; therefore, to achieve 
maximum the comic effect, it is not the father that should be murdered, but for instance 
the father’s shoe, because such an act not only requires no courage, and can also hardly 
be carried out with dignity. It should be carefully noted that being silly enough to murder 
a shoe—and not the actual murder—is the crime, and unsympathetic laughter from the 
audience is the punishment. 
 
Eco’s conclusion 
 
One of Eco’s key points in The frames of comic ‘freedom’ is that both comedy and 
tragedy restate social codes by representing its absence as something undesirable (Eco 
1984b: 4). Both police cultural boundaries and encourage its audience to behave within 
cultural norms. But once again, I insist that comedy has a more harmful effect, because 
after all, tragedy expresses that it is unfortunate when a talented king accidentally kills 
his father and marries his mother, or that one should try not to lose one’s home to foreign 
invaders, and that a girl is generally happier when not forced to become Agamemnon’s 
concubine. After all, the events in tragedies are hardly everyday occurrences. However, 
the takeaway from comedy is that petty conventions are always right. Small, everyday 
things should be done a certain way, and anyone who fails to conform is a kind of 
outsider, therefore comic laughter “ […] seeks to confirm the status quo” by 
“demitigating a certain sector of society”, and such laughter “is not laughter at power, but 
the powerful laughing at the powerless.” (Critchley  2002: 11–2) 
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William in The Name of the Rose thought that comedy should reveal that the best 
of us are fallible, and are in many ways similar to clowns, foreigners and fools. He 
imagined  
 
[…] laughter as a force for good, which can also haven an instructive value: through witty riddles 
and unexpected metaphors, though it tells us things differently from the way they are, as if it were 
lying, it actually obliges us to examine them more closely, and it make us say: Ah, this is just how 
things are, and I didn’t know it” (Eco 1984a: 472).  
 
However, this kind of laughter requires more nuance than the mockery of social outcasts, 
and as Critchley summarises, “If liberty loves humour, then slavery finds expression in 
buffoonery” (Critchley 2002: 82). In his deconstruction of the tragedy/comedy binary 
opposition, Eco defines carnival as the moment when two sides of a binary opposition are 
at their most arbitrary. It is the moment when the two sides show how easily they can 
reverse, showing that there is little distinction between them: each defines itself as the 
exact opposite of the other. More politically,  
 
Carnival is the natural theatre in which animals and animal-like beings take over the power and 
become the masters. In carnival, even kings act like the populace. Comic behaviour, formerly a 
judgement of superiority on our part, becomes, in this case, our own rule. The upside-down world 
has become the norm. Carnival is revolution (revolution is carnival): kings are decapitated (that is, 
lowered, made inferior) and the crowd is crowned. 
Such a transgressional theory has many chances to be popular today, even among the 
happy few. It sounds very aristocratic. There is but one suspicion to pollute our enthusiasm: the 
theory is unfortunately false. (Eco 1984b: 5) 
 
The frames of comic ‘freedom’, shows that the distinction between tragedy and comedy is 
arbitrary. In The Name of the Rose, William sees through the arbitrary distinctions of 
orthodoxy/heresy. The following corresponding binary oppositions have not yet been 
deconstructed, yet it is only a matter of time before the same observation applies to them: 
 
• Centre/peripheries (in the novel) 
• Benedictine seriousness/Franciscan laughter (William’s personal quest for 
Truth) 
• Epic/novelistic (Bakhtin’s cultural theory) 
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4. Deconstructions and carnival in the novel 
 
Around the middle of the novel, William’s list of carnivalesque binary oppositions end, 
and Eco’s own voice appears. I have discussed how according to Eco, the binary 
opposition is not a model for growth and openness, due to its opposites sides’ sharing of a 
common rhetoric. Unlike Bakhtin or William, Eco does not see a point in supporting the 
peripheral side of the centre/peripheries binary opposition. This section will identify 
Eco’s voice—that is, his view of carnival—by exploring examples of deconstruction and 
instances of carnival in the novel. 
I notice that on William and Adso’s third day at the abbey, or more precisely, 
after Ubertino tells Adso about the heretics on Mount Rubello, the binary oppositions are 
no longer as clear as they were in the beginning. William starts his activities at the abbey 
convinced that the peripheral side of his binary oppositions hide some sort of universal 
Truth, mostly because the centre, dominant side has already showed that it invents 
arbitrary “truths” to keep itself in power. However, just as with the deconstructed 
saint/heretic binary opposition that led to William’s resignation as an inquisitor, the 
distinctions among elements of subsequent binaries grow increasingly unclear, often 
melding into each other. These deconstructions failed to warn William, and he realises 
too late that there is little point in putting his faith in any one side of a binary opposition 
as the key to liberation, since binaries deconstruct eventually to show that the two sides 
are the same. William is a proponent of the peripheral and vernacular (in many cases, 
comedic), but as we have just seen in The frames of comic’ freedom’, Eco believes that 
there is little difference between the intentions of tragedy and the intentions of comedy if 
the two are in a binary opposition.  After certain events in the novel, Adso realises it is no 
longer necessary to organise his world into binary oppositions.  
On the third day after compline, Ubertino confuses Adso with a lecture about 
saints and heretics, after which Adso realises he can no longer distinguish between the 
most familiar binary oppositions. He looks at a picture of the Whore of Babylon while 
thinking about the Virgin Mary, reflects on the difference between the two, then mixes 
them up and leaves the labyrinth feeling restless and confused (Eco 1984a: 241). He then 
goes into the kitchen, which in this novel is the opposite of the library, the literal “lower 
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body stratum” of the abbey, where monastic vows are broken, and the deformed heretic 
procures village girls. Adso meets one of these village girls, and when he tries to talk to 
her, he is disappointed that she does not know Latin. Although he knows a bit of Italian, 
the girl speaks in a different dialect and Adso can hardly understand her in words.  
He manages to understand that she thinks he is young and handsome, and feels 
glad, although he remembers being taught that physical beauty, due to its transitory 
nature, is contemptible (unless allegorised).   
Adso describes their entire sexual encounter in a language familiar to him.  
 
But her head rose proudly on a neck as white as an ivory tower, her eyes were clear as the pools of 
Heshbon, her nose was the tower of Lebanon, her hair like purple. Yes, her tresses seemed to me 
like a flock of goats, her teeth like flocks of sheep coming up from their bath, all in pairs, so that 
none preceded its companion (Eco 1984a: 245). 
 
To a reader familiar with scripture, the images of towers, sheep and goats would evoke 
even more connotations from the same discourse. For example, likening the girl’s eyes to 
the pools of Heshbon places her as the beloved in the Song of Songs from the Old 
Testament. Adso places himself as the admiring bridegroom, and both, in this context, 
become familiar lovers whose union is authorised by the dominant discourse. To 
illustrate, when Adso looks at the girl, perhaps not in the eyes, he says to himself, 
“Pulchera sunt ubera quae paululum supereminent et tument modice”9 (Eco 1984a: 245, 
echoing Ubertino’s words fifteen pages earlier (1984a: 230).  Ubertino had said that the 
Virgin’s small breasts represent feminine virtue, and that in contrast, different breasts 
represent sin and vice. Since Adso is confused, all he knows is that he likes the breasts in 
front of him, and although this encounter with the girl is clearly forbidden, she does 
somehow remind him of things that are holy and good. While he is supposedly sinning, 
Adso is having the most pious thoughts he has throughout the entire book. Within 
minutes the two are somehow naked, they felt no shame at their bodies and cuncta errant 
bona10 (Eco 1984a: 246). These words are originally from the Vulgate, describing the 
creation of the world.  
In addition, some of Adso’s descriptions during the encounter recall those of 
                                                
9 Trans. “Beautiful are the breasts which protrude slightly, only faintly tumescent.” These are lines from 
Sermons on the Song of Solomon by Gilbert of Hoyt.  (Haft, White, J., White, R. 1999: 134). 
10 Trans. “Everything was good.” This line is from Genesis 1:31. (Haft, White, J., White, R. 1999: 135) 
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mystic saints in ecstasy. There is even an example from the novel, when William reminds 
Ubertino about the erotic mystical experience of a particularly devout woman, whom 
Ubertino admires: 
 
“Wasn’t it your Angela of Foligno who told of that day when her spirit was transported and she 
found herself in the sepulchre of Christ? Didn’t she tell how first she kissed his breast and saw 
him lying with his eyes closed, then she kissed his mouth, and there rose from those lips an 
ineffable sweetness, and after a brief pause she lay her cheek against the cheek of Christ and 
Christ put his hand to her cheek and pressed her to him and—as she said—her happiness became 
sublime?...” (Eco 1984a: 58). 
 
Adso can suppose that he, too, is having a mystical experience. In this sense, it is 
less a carnal act than a way to physically experience the beauty of scriptures. Rather than 
remaining a dutiful monk, he briefly glimpses the world through the eyes of a saint. 
It is obvious that Adso enjoyed the experience and wanted to believe that it was good, 
although monastic rules forbid the act. Quite possibly, Adso is attempting to justify it to 
himself by linking it to ecstatic descriptions in scripture. In doing so, he is bringing 
scripture to life, engaging in an interactive reading, experiencing first-hand emotions 
from the Song of Songs that other monks can only imagine. Adso’s love for the girl is 
transformed into a love for scripture and poetry. At this point, the experience becomes an 
allegory; the girl no longer stands for herself, but for the random bits of scripture, though 
it is possible that later, to Adso alone, some lines in scripture begin to stand for her as 
well. Yet the sad reality is that Adso is breaking his monastic vows to secretly spend the 
night with a poor girl from the lower strata of society, who speaks a nearly 
incomprehensible vernacular.  
Binaries: library/kitchen, wealth/poverty, virtue/violation, spiritual/carnal, holy/profane, 
virgin/whore, theory/practice. 
Deconstruction of library/kitchen and wealth/poverty: Since Adso is a monk (part of the 
dominant culture), he should not be in the kitchen in the first place, and his going into the 
kitchen is an act of degradation; that is, bringing himself down to earth, temporarily 
joining the vernacular discourses of the marketplace, abolishing hierarchy. Theresa 
Coletti, in Naming the Rose, points out that 
With the library at the top, the scriptorium in the middle, and the kitchen and refectory on the 
bottom, the Aedificium represents the hierarchy implicit in the dominant culture. And if in the 
Aedificium’s hierarchy the library is identified with the order, tradition, and the codifications of 
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official truth, the kitchen and refectory represents the force of competing values (Coletti 1988: 
128–129).  
 
Whereas the library is the locus of the official culture’s ideal of semiotic 
containment and protectionism, the kitchen and refectory are open to discord (Coletti 
1988: 130). In the original Italian, Adso is standing on the limine—threshold in the 
English translation—of the kitchen at the beginning of the scene (sul limine tra refettorio 
e cucina11). Coletti explains that Adso’s pause on the limine “indicates his entry into 
liminality” (1988: 131), or going outside of social structures. “For Adso, the kitchen is a 
new “cultural realm” of sexual arousal and multiple meanings, providing a fitting locus 
for his transgressive experiences of body and language” (Coletti 1988: 131), and I like to 
add, of social norms as well, because the kitchen is where a novice from the wealthiest 
monastic order in Europe shares a physical space with a peasant girl.  
Deconstruction of spiritual/carnal, holy/profane, virgin/whore: As mentioned before, 
earlier in the book Ubertino makes a clear distinction between virtuous feminine beauty 
and wanton feminine beauty. The virtuous inspires a love of God, the wanton tempts the 
beholder away from God, and the two types are personified as Virgin and the Whore. Yet 
for Adso, this distinction is unclear when he reflects that “My intellect knew her as an 
occasion of sin, my sensitive appetite perceived her as the vessel of every grace (Eco 
1984a: 278)”. A few hours earlier in the labyrinth, Adso had unwittingly deconstructed 
the difference between Virgin and Whore, and due to his confusion, he has no way of 
knowing for sure whether it was right or wrong to be with the girl in the kitchen; the 
dominant discourse would say that he sinned, but the truth according to Adso’s 
experience is that she inspired in him a love of all things spiritually good and beautiful: 
I thought of the girl. My flesh had forgotten the intense pleasure, sinful and fleeting (a base thing), 
that union with her had given me; but my soul had not forgotten her face, and could not manage to 
feel that this memory was perverse; rather, it throbbed as if in that face shone all the bliss of 
creation. (Eco 1984a: 278) 
 
Objectively speaking, the girl is neither the Virgin nor the Whore, but subjectively to 
Adso, perhaps she is both. By equating a peasant prostitute with the beloved from the 
Song of Songs, Adso blurs the difference between vastly different categories, neither of 
                                                
11 “I remained, on the threshold between refectory and kitchen, and so did a vague something near the 
oven.” (Eco 1984a: 242) 
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which is absolute. Whether the girl represents holiness or sin depends on her context; to 
Adso she is a personification of holy beauty, but ultimately, near the end of the novel, the 
inquisitors denounce her as a sinner and a witch.  
Deconstruction of virtue/sin, theory/practice: Initially, Adso suffers remorse for his 
actions, but soon after, he realizes that is not that the action itself was wrong, but that it 
occurred in an inappropriate context. 
Turning away from the familiar Benedictine rule, Adso temporarily ignores his 
place in society, allowing himself to simply explore the feeling of being in love. He 
redeems his action by recontextualising it so that it would no longer be considered a sin. 
As the object of love, the girl, instead of being a temptress and a whore, becomes the 
ultimate sign of everything that Adso finds good and beautiful. And in this new context, 
Adso is able to enjoy his feelings, and he realises that only his monastic context makes 
the action inappropriate. While reflecting on this, Adso says to himself, “How beautiful 
was the spectacle of nature not yet touched by the often perverse wisdom of man!” (Eco 
1984a: 282). 
Afterwards, in what I consider some of the most beautiful passages from the 
novel, the lovesick Adso falls into a melancholy with an intense longing to see the girl 
again, consoling himself with memories of the previous night. (Eco 1984a: 278–284). 
 
[…] I “saw” the girl, I saw her in the branches of the bare tree that stirred lightly when a 
benumbed sparrow flew to seek refuge there; I saw her in the eyes of the heifers that came out of 
the barn, and I heard her in the bleating of the sheep that crossed my erratic path. It was as if all 
creation spoke to me of her. (Eco 1984a: 278) 
 
As Adso begins to perceive his surroundings as metaphors for the girl, he feels that she is 
overwhelmingly present. Everywhere he looks he sees signs of her; he has reinterpreted 
the world so that everything contains traces of her presence. Yet at the same time Adso 
suffers from her absence, since if all signs signify the absence of the signified, then being 
surrounded by multiple signs of the girl is more than enough to remind him that she is not 
actually present. Everything he sees can only substitute for the girl, because she herself is 
not actually present.  
Deconstruction of virtue/violation, presence/absence: Adso’s encounter with the girl in 
the kitchen is not objectively virtuous or sinful. Whether it is considered one or another 
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depends entirely on its contextual framing, making its place in the binary opposition 
completely arbitrary. Since Adso is a monk, the act is a transgression, but interpreting the 
act as a transgression says more about the interpreter than the act itself; as Adso shows 
that he can just as well consider the act something good, if only he were not a monk.  
And therefore what I had suffered that morning was evil for me, but for others perhaps was good, 
the sweetest of good things; thus I understand now that my distress was not due to the depravity of 
my thoughts, in themselves worthy and sweet, but to the depravity of the gap between my 
thoughts and the vows I had pronounced. (Eco 1984a: 280) 
 
Adso’s later melancholy in the garden is a turning point in the novel. The girl here 
becomes “the dialectic of presence and absence” (Coletti 1988: 71), and 
 
Adso’s momentary perception that meaning is produced by absence experienced as desire links his 
feelings for the girl to a poststructuralist conception of the sign”, because absence causes 
differentiation, which creates meaning. A sign cannot be the exact thing it signifies, and 
signification always implies the absence of the actual signified12 (Coletti 1988: 71).  
 
Since a sign’s meaning is generated from its difference from other signs, each sign 
contains traces—that is, from differences—of what it does not mean, and a presence 
contains traces of the absence of what it is not (Derrida 1976: 24). By being absent, the 
girl can be represented by signs that at once evoke her discrete elements of her presence, 
while reminding Adso signs cannot replace the girl herself. While reminding Adso of the 
girl, the signs around him scream at the same time that she is not there13.  
 
[…] everything, in other words, spoke to me only of the face I had hardly glimpsed in the aromatic 
shadows of the kitchen […] if the whole world spoke to me of the girl, who (sinner though she 
may have been) was nevertheless a chapter in the great book of creation, a verse of the great psalm 
chanted by the cosmos […] it could only be a part of the great theophanic design that sustains the 
universe, arranged like a lyre, miracle of consonance and harmony. As if intoxicated, I then 
enjoyed her presence in the things I saw, and, desiring her in them, with the sight of them I was 
sated. 
And yet I felt a kind of sorrow, because at the same time I suffered from an absence, though I was 
happy with the many ghosts of a presence. (Eco 1984a: 279) 
 
By realising that his frame was what marked his night with the girl as a 
transgression, Adso’s experience adds a new voice to the novel:  Like William’s 
                                                
12 Borges’ On exactitude in science shows an example in which the sign is identical to its referent. 
Cartographers sought to create the perfect map that matched its referent completely. Later discovering that 
it is useless, they destroy it, leaving the empire it mapped destroyed in the same manner. 
 
13 According to Coletti, “The Italian makes more explicit the connection between Adso’s longing for the 
girl as a presence and as sign and the novel’s larger exploration of language and signification: “perche nin 
mi era neppure concesso […] di lamentarmi invocando il nome dell’ amata” (Rosa 409). The name of the 
beloved (“il nome dell’ amata”) and the name of the rose (“il nome della rosa”) are the same name.” 
(Coletti 1988: 71) 
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deconstruction of saint/heretic and orthodoxy/heresy, Adso’s deconstructions regarding 
the girl and his transgression remind the reader of Eco’s own views on binary 
oppositions, as expressed in The frames of comic ‘freedom’. Before Adso’s 
deconstructions, the novel explored William’s carnivalesque tendency to side with the 
peripheral discourse in a binary opposition. Here the novel shifts to showing binary 
oppositions as Adso now sees them; from this point on, the novel lists deconstructed 
binary opposites and instances of carnival in which binary oppositions fully display their 
instability. There is no longer a need for the carnivalesque; it is possible that by listing 
deconstructed binaries, Eco is responding to Bakhtin, showing that it was pointless for 
William to take sides in binary oppositions, because the ones William sided with are no 
more stable than the deconstructed binary oppositions that appear later in the novel: 
  
On the fourth day, Severinus discusses the different uses of his herbs. Whether they are 
poisons or cures depends on the context in which they are used: 
 
As I told you before, many of these herbs, duly compounded and administered in the proper 
dosage, could be used for lethal beverages and ointments. Over there, datura stramonium, 
belladonna, hemlock: they can bring on drowsiness, stimulation, or both; taken with due care they 
are excellent medicines, but in excess doses they bring on death. (Eco 1984a: 262) 
 
Deconstruction of antidote/poison: the same plants can be used to cure or to poison, 
therefore the plants in Severinus’ lab are not universally helpful or harmful; their effect 
depends on a variety of other factors, such as usage and dose. Earlier in the discussion, 
Adso admits, “I was upset. I had always believed that logic was a universal weapon, but 
now I realized how its validity depended on the way it was employed” (Eco 1984a: 262). 
On the sixth night, Adso tells William about a particularly strange dream, and 
William points out that this dream resembles the Coena Cypriani, a text also praised by 
Bakhtin in Rabelais and his World for exemplifying carnival, particularly in its use of 
banquet imagery banquet imagery (Bakhtin 1984: 288). However, in Adso’s dream, the 
scene detailed by the text suggests chaos rather than liberation. 
  
[…] Jorge drank from a great mug of wine, and Remigio, dressed like Bernard Gui, held a book 
shaped like a scorpion, virtuously reading the lives of the saints and passages from the Gospels, 
but they were stories about Jesus joking with the apostle, reminding him that he was a stone and 
on that shameless stone that rolled over the plain he would build his church, or the story of Saint 
Jerome commenting on the Bible and saying that God wanted to bare Jerusalem’s behind. And at 
every sentence the cellarer read, Jorge laughed, pounded his fist on the table, and shouted, “You 
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shall be the next abbot, by God’s belly!” Those were his very words, may the Lord forgive me. 
(Eco 1984a: 428) 
 
Bakhtin believes that feasts express liminality, and are always related to time and 
breaking points in cycles, in which “Moments of death and revival, of change and 
renewal always led to a festive perception of the world.” (Bakhtin 1984: 9). In the dream, 
Adso also recognises his beloved, the “maiden terrible as an army with banners”, this 
time dressed in rich clothing and presented as the Virgin Mary (Eco 1984a: 428-429), 
with  
[…] a crown of white pearls on her head, a double strand, and two cascades of pearls fell on either 
side of her face, mingling with two other rows which hung on her bosom, and from each pearl 
hung a diamond as big as a plum. (Eco 1984a: 428). 
 
There are more riches and abundance, including the eating of locusts and whales, “And 
gifts of valuable relics such as “the tail of Saint Ubertina14, the uterus of Saint Venantia” 
and “the neck of Saint Burgosina engraved like a goblet at the age of twelve15” (Eco 
1984a: 432). The writing includes a handful of reversals, and in addition to the 
“diamonds as big as plums” there are also “plums as big as diamonds” (Eco 1984a: 428, 
430); during the feast, “some died laughing and some laughed dying” (Eco 1984: 431); 
additionally, there is a reference to Bakhtin’s assertion that feasts are related to time, 
because in Adso’s dream, Jesus fasted for forty days and forty nights during the single 
night of a feast (Eco 1984a: 430), a unique and somewhat pointless miracle. Near the end 
of the dream, William’s teacher, Roger Bacon, appears from out of the sky in a flying 
machine (Eco 1984a: 430)16. 
 The dream contains many instances of solemn figures—Abo, Jorge and characters 
from scripture—behaving outlandishly. Their behaviour degrades them, bringing them 
down to earth by removing the authority they gain from epic distance. Without epic 
distance, these figures become yet additional voices among the many in the marketplace 
                                                
14 Just as in the novel, the historical Ubertino da Casale is a Franciscan, which lead me to think that maybe 
“Saint Ubertina” is a wolf. The wolf that Saint Francis preached to (the Wolf of Gubbio) is male, though, 
but it is possible that Adso dreamed up for him a saintly female disciple. It is nonsense, in any case. 
15 Eco mentions the skull of Saint John the Baptist at the age of twelve in at least three works: The Name of 
the Rose, The Aesthetics of Chaosmos (1982) and Inventing the Enemy (2011). In his novel Baudolino 
(2000), the characters keep a total of seven heads of John the Baptist to give away as gifts to the kings they 
meet on their journey. 
16 To be fair, Roger Bacon does seem to have a rather dry sense of humor. When asked to prove that 
diamonds can be cut without the use of goat’s blood, he simply said, “I saw it with my own eyes” (Eco 
2002: 64). 
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This old authority and truth pretended to be absolute, to have an extratemporal importance. 
Therefore, their representations […] are gloomily serious. They cannot and do not wish to laugh 
[…] They do not see themselves in the mirror of time, do not perceive their own origin, limitations 
and end; they do not recognise their own ridiculous faces or the comic nature of their pretentions 
to eternity and immutability […] Time has transformed old truths and authority […] a comic 
monster that the laughing crowd rends to pieces in the marketplace. (Bakhtin 1984: 212 –213). 
 
Bakhtin considers mockery to be a democratic act that turns people from different 
spheres of society into equals.  
 However, as transgressive as the contents of the dream appear, the Coena 
Cypriani (in this case, with some added details from Adso’s waking life) was originally 
used as a mnemonic device meant for learning episodes in scriptures, and “through its 
jesting, the young could more easily commit to memory certain episodes of sacred 
history” (Eco 1984a: 437): 
David stood on a mound, John on the floor, Pharoah on the sand (naturally, I said to myself, but 
why?), Lazarus on the table, Jesus on the edge of the well, Zaccheus on the boughs of a tree […] 
Thecla on the window sill (from outside, Adelmo’s pale face appeared, as he warned her it was 
possible to fall down, down the cliff), Susanna in the garden, Judas among the graves […] (Eco 
1984a: 429). 
 
Therefore, in spite of its comic transgressions, Adso’s dream contains a fair number of 
correct scenes from scriptures. It appears the Coena, at least for Adso, fulfilled its 
intentions, because even if it contains humorous scenes, its intention is still to encourage 
the correct memorisation of sacred texts. In Frames, Eco writes that  
Carnival, in order to be enjoyed, requires that its rules and rituals be parodied, and that these rules 
and rituals already be recognized and respected. One must know to what degree certain behaviors 
are forbidden, and must feel the majesty of the forbidding norm, to appreciate their transgression. 
Without a rule to break, carnival is impossible […] The Coena Cypriani quoted by Bachtin, a 
burlesque representation based on the subversion of topical situations of the Scriptures, was 
enjoyed as a comic transgression only by people who took the same Scriptures seriously during 
the rest of the year. (Eco 1984b: 6). 
 
Later the scene grows more violent, displaying yet more of what Bakhtin 
considers the popular festive aesthetics of carnival:  
Thus blood is transformed into wine; ruthless slaughter and the martyr’s death are transformed 
into a merry banquet; the stake becomes a hearth. Bloodshed, dismemberment, burning, death, 
beating, blows, curses and abuses—all these elements are steeped in “merry time”, time which 
kills and gives birth, which allows nothing old to be perpetuated and never ceases to generate the 
new and youthful. (Bakhtin 1984: 211). 
 
The description in Adso’s dream contains these gory elements of carnival, along with 
more scriptural mnemonics: 
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But the worst was when they found a black rooster on the girl, black and beautiful she was, like a 
cat of the same color, and they called her a witch and a Pseudo Apostle, so all flung themselves on 
her, to punish her. The Baptist decapitated her, Abel cut her open, Adam drove her out, 
Nebuchadnezzar wrote zodiacal signs on her breast with a fiery hand, Elijah carried her off in a 
fiery chariot, Noah plunged her in water, Lot changed her into a pillar of salt, Susanna accused her 
of lust, Joseph betrayed her with another woman, Ananias stuck her into a furnace, Sampson 
chained her up, Paul flagellated her, Peter crucified her head down, Stephen stoned her, Lawrence 
burned her on a grate, Bartolomew skinned her, Judas denounced her, the cellarer burned her, and 
Peter denied everything. (Eco 1984a: 432) 
 
The scene is violent, but hardly merry. Adso overdoses on carnival and parody and in 
general, has a negative impression of carnival, which he sees more as needlessly 
confusing rather than liberating. An important point is that carnival destroys excessively; 
it does not destroy old hierarchies, but it does destroy any sense of order and harmony, 
and rather than creating something new out of fragments of the old, it only leaves only 
the fragments: 
The girl’s body, once so beautiful and sweet, was now lacerated, torn into fragments that were 
scattered among the glass cases and gold-and-crystal reliquaries of the crypt. Or, rather, it was not 
the body of the girl that went to fill the crypt, it was the fragments of the crypt that […] gradually 
composed to form the girl’s body […] It was now as if a single immense body had, in the course 
of millennia, dissolved into its parts […] and as if the substantial form of man’s very body, the 
masterpiece of creation, had scattered into plural and separate accidental forms, thus becoming the 
image of its own opposite, form no longer ideal but earthly, of dust and stinking fragments, 
capable of signifying only death and destruction…. (Eco 1984a: 432–433).  
 
In short, Adso’s dream is a negative commentary on both the popular-festive forms of 
carnival, as well as its transgressive element. The violent, mocking and obscene laughter 
characteristic of Bakhtin’s feast descriptions hardly resemble the “true nature of the 
world” (Bakhtin 1984: 9), and for all its violence, carnival does not go far enough in its 
transgression.  
 
The monastery’s library follows a strictly structured system that catalogues its books 
based on their origin and contents17. The books are separated into groups named after 
                                                
17 The library consists of a centre surrounded by sixteen rooms. These sixteen rooms are at the centre of 
sixteen more rooms. In addition, there are four towers, one for each cardinal direction, surrounding these 
outer sixteen rooms. Yet five more rooms line the outer perimeter of each tower, so the library has a total of 
fifty-six rooms.   
Each room is assigned a verse from Revelation, and the first letter of adjacent rooms can be read together 
as the name of the following regions: Acaia (Greece), Aegyptus (Egypt), Anglia (England), Gallia (France), 
Germania (Germany), Hibernia (Ireland), Iudaia (Palestine), Leones (Ethiopia), Roma (Italian city-states), 
Yspania (Spain) and the Fons Adae (the earthly paradise; this description corresponds to the contents rather 
than the origin of the books it contains). The finis Africae (the end of Africa, here understood as the 
peripheries of the geographical world) apparently does not contain books from the literal end of Africa, but 
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geographical locations, and it is only on the seventh night that William and Adso finally 
solve the puzzle that opens the finis Africae, the most restricted category containing 
books about the cultural periphery. Throughout his investigation, William had believed 
there to be one murderer acting according to a plan based on the book of Revelations, but 
as it turns out, not only were there multiple assailants acting according to different 
motivations, but that the key ‘murderer’ was an inanimate object, a copy of Aristotle’s 
treatise on comedy printed on linen paper and painted with poison. Although the narrative 
that William constructed out of clues did lead him to the source of the murders, the 
narrative itself was mostly false. He and Adso find Jorge waiting for them in the finis 
Africae, and although Jorge did spread poison on Aristotle’s book, he did not physically 
carry out any of the murders himself: Adelmo died by suicide after engaging in 
homosexual activities with the assistant library Berengar in order to gain access to the 
forbidden book; Severinus is murdered by Malachi in a fit of jealousy; Venantius, 
Berengar and Malachi all die by reading the poisoned book; and lastly, Abo suffocates in 
the labyrinth while trying to entre the finis Africae.  
  
                                                                                                                                            
instead, its books discuss culturally peripheral themes such as parody, laughter and the wisdom of holy 
fools. Although it is natural for some of these categories—say, Acaia, Aegyptus and Iudaia—to contain 
pre-Christian, pre-Catholic and Jewish texts; it is implied that books considered heretical by the Catholic 
Church are locked up in the finis Africae. 
 The library does not seem to have rooms devoted to Persian and Arabic texts, so it is unclear 
whether a commentary on Aristotle by Averroes or Avicenna would belong in Acaia or the finis Africae. In 
addition, there is no category for Russian texts, although a bishop from Kaffa (Theodosia in the Crimea) 
does make a short visit (Eco 1984a: 342). Since this bishop was in the company of Bernard Gui, he is 
probably Catholic. However, this is historically unlikely since the Crimea would continue to be under 
Mongol rule until the middle of the century. In any case, it is unclear whether books from this region would 
be consider Greek or from “the end of Africa”. 
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5. Carnival and the problem of reference 
5.1 The novelistic and unlimited semiosis 
 
William and Jorge have an intense debate in the finis Africae. Jorge prompted the string 
of murders in an attempt to protect what he considered the Word of God, or the universal 
Truth. In his view, the abbey’s library must remain closed in order to protect the Truth 
from distortions made possible by writing and interpretation, which will inevitable 
happen if monks begin debating with books as if they were living and fallible. Jorge 
believes that learning through signs is extraneous to the understanding of a singular and 
incontestable truth. Of particular importance to him is the assurance that truth cannot be 
mocked, and therefore the book he fears the most is Aristotle’s treatise on comedy.  
Teresa Coletti’s theory is that William and Jorge are deconstructions of each 
other, because both sought to preserve knowledge, whether in isolation of circulation, and 
therefore they express different sides of the same trope (Coletti 1988: 174). But here I 
must disagree; keep in mind that Jorge started the fire in the library, hardly an act of 
preservation. Coletti comments, “It is painfully ironic that William and Jorge’s efforts to 
preserve knowledge, albeit in distinct ways, culminate in both a real and a symbolic 
destruction of culture and civilization in which there is nothing left to read” (Coletti 
1988: 174). Jorge worked to preserve was the integrity of the Word as a referent, sees the 
library as a threat, and its contents as a distraction from the already perfect and 
incontestable Truth. Keeping the library in isolation was not an effort to preserve its 
contents from decay, but to act as if they had never existed at all (we must keep in mind 
that Abo is running the abbey, and he keeps the library as a status symbol. If Jorge had 
been the abbot, there would likely not have been a library at all, or at least a much 
diminished one). William needed the library’s books to be read because he believed they 
contain the multiple aspects of a universal Truth. 
This is the catch: William values above everything else the notion of a singular 
and unified Truth. Having been an inquisitor once, he never stopped in his search for a 
universal Truth, and is willing to go to any length to find it. He admits tendency in an off-
guard moment, saying, “No one must ever oblige us to know, Adso. We must, that is all, 
even if we comprehend imperfectly” (Eco 1984a: 450). From his first entrance at the 
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abbey, William shows that his interest in signs is an extension in his need to find a single 
referent, a ‘Truth’ any given frame: William finds the lost horse Brunellus through traces 
(signs, clues), using absence to piece together a presence. All of the signs he uses lead to 
Brunellus as a referent.  
Ideally, Abo’s relics and allegorical numbers should all point to one referent, to God 
in this instance. In a similar way during his murder investigation, William wanted his 
signs—that is, his clues—to point to a single referent—the murderer. Although he takes 
pride in being an “enlightened” and “peripheral” Franciscan, referencing William of 
Occam (1285-1347) and Roger Bacon (1214-1294), and utilising unorthodox tools 
methods during his investigation, his expectation that Truth exists as a singular referent 
Truth makes his quest no different from that of Jorge, Abo or the inquisitors. His jokes, 
paradoxes and deconstructions were made for the sake of constructing a unified account 
of why there were mysterious deaths in the abbey. The point here is that William’s use of 
the carnivalesque; that is, his assumption that the collective peripheral discourses of a 
given culture contains this culture’s universal Truth, makes little sense. As long as 
William expects his signs to point to a referent, rather than to more signs, he is relying on 
the epic voice, the very thing he has opposed throughout his stay at the abbey. Since by 
definition of the novelistic, no single voice can speak the ‘Truth’ for all discourses, thus 
there is no universal Truth in novelistic discourse, because each voice within it 
claims a truth of its own. The subjectivity allowed in a novelistic context requires the 
sacrifice of a universal Truth.  
 
At the very least, William expected to an absolute referent specific to each context; for 
example, when searching for Brunellus, Brunellus is the referent at the centre of the many 
signs he left. William believed that even as signs led to more signs, eventually the chain 
of signification will stop and point to a single referent, therefore each sign is a necessary 
step leading towards this referent. In a chain of signification, each sign should lead one 
step closer to the ultimate referent, so every clue would be the next step in discovering 
the single mastermind behind the murders. Like the narrative that he created, which he 
thought had led him to the murderer, William believed that the chain of signification 
contains no random elements.  
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However, in a true, radical case of unlimited semiosis, the chain of signification 
does not stop after revealing the ‘correct’ referent. In fact, it does not stop at all. Each 
sign points to a yet another sign as its referent, and the chain has no end.  
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5.2 Signification and reference in the novelistic 
 
Bakhtin suggests that the novelistic world does not have referents, only signification: 
“[…] no living word relates to its object in a singular way”, because “[…] the receiver is 
already “entangled, shot through with shared thoughts, points of view, alien value 
judgments and accents” (Bakhtin 1981: 276). In other words, if words are signs, then the 
addresser uses his personal background to determine their reference; signs are interpreted 
according to the addressee, and are not necessarily attached to any particular referent. 
During the confrontation with Jorge, William realises that a situation without a referent is 
horrific. If his words are signs, and his intentions are their referents, Jorge squeezes 
alternate interpretations out of William’s words exemplifying a completely novelistic 
situation in which there are no “correct” referents. William’s words are not interpreted 
according to the code he had in mind when he spoke them.   
 
I hate you, Jorge, and if I could, I would lead you downstairs, across the ground, naked, with a 
fowl’s feathers stuck in your asshole and your face painted like a juggler and a buffoon, so the 
whole monastery would laugh at you and be afraid no longer. (Eco 1984a: 477) 
 
Indeed, Jorge becomes laughable just a handful of pages (pun intended) later: 
 
[…] he went on tearing the pages, determined to devour his prey as quickly as possible […] 
Disfigured by anxiety, by the menace of the poison now flowing abundantly through his veins, by 
his desperate and diabolical determination, the venerable figure of the old man now seemed 
disgusting and grotesque. At other moments he might have inspired laughter, but we, too, were 
reduced to the condition of animals […] (Eco 1984a: 483) 
 
William had liked his words’ capacity for play, but when their referents are made 
irrelevant in a completely novelistic context, his own words mock him: William had 
wanted to see Jorge made ridiculous so that he would no longer be an authority figure, 
but instead, Jorge becomes ridiculous as he eats the last copy of Aristotle’s book. He had 
sought a universal Truth in common and peripheral spheres of culture, but following the 
fire, the abbey’s poverty following the destruction of its library fails to express any kind 
of universal Truth. William had wanted freer access to the books; in the end, all of the 
monks had full access to the books while the library was burning. William had not 
considered these interpretations of his words before, and at this point, his words and 
investigative methods, and even core beliefs betray him. 
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William did not anticipate that his words and their intentions would be absorbed into 
Jorge’s discourse. William had sought dialogue in the library, but the confrontation with 
Jorge presented him with another way in which dialogue could take place.  
 
In Discourse in the novel, Bakhtin claims that novelistic dialogue depends on 
[…] an active understanding, one that assimilates the word under consideration into a new 
conceptual system, that of the one striving to understand establishes a series of complex inter-
relationships, consonances and dissonances with the word and enriches it with new elements. It is 
precisely such an understanding that the speaker counts on. (Bakhtin 1981: 282) 
 
Essentially, Bakhtin is saying that interpretation is a dialogic act, and that words spoken 
through dialogue cannot be spoken through the authority of epic distance. Demanding a 
particular referent renders the discourse authoritarian, and by virtue of its definition, 
[…] authoritarian discourse permits no play with the context framing it, no play with its borders, 
no spontaneously creative stylizing variants on it…It is indissolubly fused with its authority—with 
political power, an institution, a person—and it stands and falls together with that authority. 
(Bakhtin 1981: 343) 
 
Since William does not speak through epic distance, then by Bakhtin’s conception of 
dialogue, his words can be interpreted in a number of ways depending on the receiver’s 
personal background. If one were to apply Bakhtinian’s notion of novelistic dialogue 
consistently, if William believes that monks should have freedom to interpret scripture in 
ways that may not always meet the Church’s requirements, he must also give Jorge the 
freedom to interpret his own words (because as owner of the words, he is the authority 
figure) according to his Jorge’s own points of view, value judgments and accents. 
Thus, discourse in a novelistic context is a double-edged sword. When the listener gains 
the power to interpret the speaker’s words at will, the speaker is no longer an 
authoritative figure. However, The listener then becomes the authority figure; having full 
control over the speaker’s words is similar to telling the speaker what to say. An 
example: 
W.W. Jacobs’ short story The Monkey’s Paw tells of a British sergeant returning 
from India, who brings back the mummified hand of a monkey, which allegedly has the 
power to grant its owner three wishes. He shows this to his friend Mr. White, whose son 
Herbert casually suggests that he wish for 200 pounds. The next day, Herbert dies when 
he is in a factory machine, after which his employer pays Mr. White a compensation of 
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200 pounds. A week after Herbert’s funeral, Mr. White tries to wish him back, but it is 
heavily implied that what comes back is the mangled corpse that had been completely 
unrecognisable after the accident. Mrs. White uses the third wish for the son to go away 
before Mr. White can open the door.  
 
Bakhtin appears to argue that in true discourse, the speaker has no full control over his 
words. The listener must be given assimilate them into his own worldview; in other 
words, the speaker is passive, and the listener is allowed to actively transform the 
speaker’s words. Yet does Jorge’s mocking misinterpretation of William’s words really 
count as “enrichment”? Are Mr. White’s words “enriched” when he finds out his wish for 
his son to come back can also be interpreted as a wish for his son’s mangled and rotting 
corpse to return knocking in the dead of night? Does Bakhtin’s novelistic discourse offer 
any insurance against intentional misinterpretation? 
“In the atmosphere of a novel, the direct and unmediated intention of a word presents itself as 
something impermissibly naïve, something in fact impossible, for naïveté itself, under authentic 
novelistic conditions, takes on the nature of an internal polemic and is consequently dialogised…” 
(278). 
 
Interestingly, an “active understanding” does not work both ways in this context. After 
all, it is possible for Jorge to project his unmediated intentions onto William’s words. 
Therefore, novelistic conditions do not guarantee the removal of an authoritarian 
presence: a speaker addressing a voiceless audience may be an oppressive tyrant, but a 
listener that mocks the speaker’s obvious intentions is a bully. In lowering the authority 
of the speaker’s voice, Bakhtin’s novelistic elevates the listener’s voice into that of an 
authoritarian. If a speaker and a listener’s voices are set up as a binary opposition in 
which one voice is authoritarian, a carnivalesque switch of roles between the two does 
not eliminate the authoritarian voice from the system.  
Even if William did succeed in destabilising the binary opposition, the elements 
merely switched places, keeping the opposition between them unchanged so that no rule 
is broken, no frame is questioned, and the attempt at deconstructing the binary ends in 
failure. This total reversal of elements in a binary opposition is carnival, an upside-down 
world where the fool is king, William liked to think, but the problem is that there is still a 
fool, and there is still a king.  
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Carnival occurs when the opposite sides of a binary are at their closest in 
proximity and most interchangeable. It is the moment of deconstruction, the moment in 
which binary oppositions prove themselves useless as truly antagonistic systems, and it 
appears that William—and Bakhtin—overlooked it somehow. Whereas William intended 
a transgression to challenge the frame set by dominant discourse, carnival is the illusion 
of transgression, which is in fact authorized by the dominant discourse (Eco 1984b: 6). 
Additionally, carnival can be characterised by proximity of the opposite sides of a binary 
opposite. Right before the fire, the mysterious library used the illusion of a ghost patrol to 
keep discourage potential readers; however, a few hours later, the monks are running in 
and out to either rescue books or read them. Jorge eats the book in a ferocious manner 
and looks rather clownish doing it, but just a short while ago he spoke with solemnity and 
dignity. When he first opened the finis Africae, William saw the opportunity to read and 
make countless interpretations and commentaries on the books, but after the fire there 
could be no interpretation at all.  
 
Eco leaves one more puzzle at the end of his novel: why did William seek Aristotle’s 
book, and why did Jorge want to destroy it? If Aristotle does show comedy as a tool of 
containment, as Eco described it in The frames of comic ‘freedom’, then it is dangerous to 
William, but validating to Jorge.  
 In any case, there is one hero all of the characters overlooked: recall that in the 
novel, Aristotle’s book on comedy is bound along with an Arabic manuscript “which 
hold that fools utter clever remarks that amaze even their priests and delight their 
caliphs…” (Eco 1984a: 467). It contains exactly what William sought, but was 
unfortunately overlooked due to its author being an anonymous Arab whose written 
language looks like fly dung to our protagonists, someone who in this case is as marginal 
as the fools that utter clever remarks, who is most certainly “other”, the butt of mockery 
in classical plays… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 70 
5.3 Final thoughts: reconciling the epic and the novelistic 
 
At various points in his work, Bakhtin opposes the authoritarian voice, or in his words the 
voice of epic distance, for the reason that it claims its own discourse as a complete and 
universal Truth. He claims that its static nature makes it a poor model of the ever-
changing world of culture and society. However, any voice that speaks with specific 
referents in mind speaks with some degree of authority. Any sign that has a specific 
referent is in some ways authoritative, and any word that demands a specific 
interpretation is authoritative as well; in short, the ‘epic’ component of discourse 
corresponds less to authoritarianism than to reference in signification. 
 It may be useful to state again that in Bakhtin’s essay Epic and novel, ‘epic’ and 
‘novelistic’ began as descriptions of two different but not binarily opposed genres. The 
carnivalesque places these two concepts in a binary opposition, while believing that 
‘novelistic’ discourses should prevail over the epic. Structurally speaking, this is 
impossible, because a binary opposition requires for both of its elements to negatively 
define each other. However, this is a contradiction within the concept of the 
carnivalesque. The epic voice does not have to be equated with the authoritarian voice, as 
long as it stays within its own discourse, and does not propose to become the sole 
discourse in any given culture.  
 The epic voice is necessary and inevitable, as it is inseparable from the referent of 
any given sign, and in fact, the Bakhtinian concepts of epic and novelistic indeed are very 
much dependent on each other, but not as binary opposites. The novelistic is essentially a 
collection of epic voices in dialogue, and the epic only risks becoming authoritarian when 
removed from the context of a novel, away from the dialogue of equally valid peer 
voices. The authority in an epic voice is essential because without it, in a purely 
novelistic world, signification occurs without reference. Although Eco does not believe 
the intentions of the author are important, he does give significance to the intention of the 
text (Eco 1992: 145). In other words, the author’s interpretation of the work is not 
authoritative above other readers’ interpretations, it will be in dialogue with these other 
interpreters’ voices; however, textual intentions matter count because each word in the 
text has a referent specific to its context, which the text also provides. 
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 It is not clear whether an exact model showing an open, novelistic culture as a 
collection of epic voices exists. However, Yurij Lotman’s semiospheric model of culture, 
appears as something very close, namely, in its representation of culture as collection of 
interdependent parts, in which each part is a fully-functioning whole. It is beyond the 
limits of this present work to re-evaluate the semiosphere as a combination of epic voices 
stratified into a novelistic structure, yet such a task may shed some new light on the 
semiosphere, as well as the role of reference in an open culture. 
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Conclusion 
 
The master’s thesis at hand suggests an evaluation on the application of Bakhtinian 
literary concepts in the study of culture, using Umberto Eco's The Name of the Rose as a 
sample context. Following the delimitation of the topic, a close reading of Eco’s novel 
analyses the interdependency of the Bakhtinian concepts of the epic and the novelistic. 
Eco's novel functions an example that highlights a structural contradiction in Bakhtinian 
aesthetics, namely in his concept of the carnivalesque, which places the epic and 
novelistic in an inverted binary opposition.  
The formation of the epic, the novelistic and the carnivalesque began with 
Mikhail Bakhtin’s studies on Dostoevsky’s polyphonic novels. Bakhtin later expanded 
into general literary studies while writing the essays collected in The Dialogic 
Imagination, which introduce his unique concepts of ‘epic’ and ‘novel’. Bakhtin 
characterises the epic as a well-established literary genre that distances itself from the 
present, taking on a finished quality that encourages its readers to act as a passive 
audience, rather than engaging with the work. In contrast, the novel is a relatively young 
genre comprised of multiple voices stratified within the work itself, which is left open to 
dialogue and interpretation from its readers. In his literary theory, Bakhtin’s concepts of 
epic and novel were initially descriptive categories; however, both concepts crossed over 
into Bakhtin’s cultural theory, where elements of authoritarianism (or the cultural centre) 
now correspond to the aesthetics of the epic; and peripheral, vernacular, hybrid and 
socially heterogeneous phenomena fell under the label of novelistic. 
Later on, Bakhtin’s Rabelais and his World, a survey of late medieval aesthetics, 
expanded upon his earlier concept of carnival and the carnivalesque, which politicises the 
cultural notions of the epic and the novelistic. Carnival initially derives from the Feast of 
Fools, a medieval festival in which the lay people are permitted one day for mocking the 
state and religious authorities. However, Bakhtin politicises this festival, making an 
overview of carnivalesque aesthetics, and arguing that the carnivalesque signifies 
rebellion against the authoritarian rule of the Church. Aesthetic elements of the Feast of 
Fools become politicised as well: feasting became interpreted as expressions of 
temporality and social growth, grotesque forms became manifestations of transgressions 
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of physical and social limits, and the mockery and degradation of authority figures 
become ways to rhetorically bring them down to earth, in order to mingle among the 
vernacular voices of the marketplace. Thus, Bakhtin’s concept of the carnivalesque 
regards novelistic aspects of culture as politically subversive, anti-authoritarian and 
democratic. Bakhtin interprets the Feast of Fools itself as a brief window of social 
equality, and the carnivalesque as a celebration of all cultural phenomena that can be 
considered peripheral, vulgar, open and incomplete.  
However, the concept of carnivalesque contains an inner contradiction: it places 
the epic and novelistic into a mutually-dependent binary opposition, and proposes for the 
novelistic to free itself of the epic. Since as a component of a binary opposition, the 
novelistic defines itself as the direct opposite of the epic, being completely free of its own 
image in negatives is impossible.  
 Umberto Eco’s 1980 novel The Name of the Rose creates an aesthetic world based 
on Bakhtin’s aesthetics of carnival. In fact, the novel clearly and thoroughly reveals flaws 
of the carnivalesque: its protagonist, Brother William of Baskerville, follows an agendum 
similar to that of Bakhtin in his rejection of the epic voice in his context—the solemnity 
of the Church, political and religious authority figures, ecclesiastical tradition including 
orthodox interpretations of scripture, political power and its accompanying material 
wealth—in favour of vernacular mockery and laughter. It should be noted that both 
William and Bakhtin believe (erroneously, according to Eco) that supporting the 
novelistic side of the epic/novel binary in a cultural context will lead them to the 
discovery of a single and unified Truth, or a truer representation of the world. 
 Eco’s commentary on Bakhtin can be gleaned from William’s failure to find a 
universal Truth in the novel. Like Bakhtin, William sees the social and cultural 
phenomena around him in terms of binary oppositions. In the end, he realises that in 
supporting the novelistic side of the binary, he had unwittingly been a proponent of the 
epic side as well; that is, in supporting the repressed peripheral discourses of a culture, 
William had accidentally validated the culture’s need for creating a peripheries. The 
problem is not choosing a side in a binary opposition, but rather the binary configuration 
itself. William’s error is that, in assuming the authoritarian voice of the Catholic Church 
tells a lie, the repressed peripheral voices must then tell some form of universal Truth. 
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However, only a truly authoritarian voice can claim to know a universal Truth; a 
novelistic culture includes a “truth” for every voice it contains. None of these are 
universal.  
 
To make my argument—that Eco’s novel illustrates a structural flaw within Bakhtin’s 
concept of the carnivalesque—I first set out to prove that The Name of the Rose is a 
polyphonic novel. This detail is significant because polyphonic novels give the voices 
they contain ample freedom to express their own discourses. Since Bakhtin’s voice as a 
proponent of the carnivalesque is present in this work, it is important to show that the 
novel allowed this voice to reveal the self-defeating flaw of the carnivalesque without 
much tampering from the author.  
 Since the carnivalesque works by placing the concepts of the epic and novelistic 
into an inverted binary opposition, the body of this work contains a list of inverted binary 
oppositions corresponding with epic/novelistic. There is a brief pause from the close 
reading of Eco’s novel to discuss Eco’s own views on carnivalesque inverted binary 
oppositions, after which I point out instances in which these views manifest in the later 
parts of the novel. The final chapter explores canivalesque reversals and the problem of 
reference; throughout the thesis, I give examples of Eco or William opposing the extreme 
authoritarian voice; however, the extreme novelistic voice is just as dangerous and 
oppressive. The work closes by suggesting an alternate model in which to systematise 
Bakhtin’s concepts of epic and the novelistic, to integrate them without antagonism. This 
model would call for a complete removal of the carnivalesque.  
It is unclear and probably irrelevant whether Eco meant for The Name of the Rose 
to be read as a response to Bakhtin. Despite strongly criticising Bakhtin’s carnivalesque, 
Eco responds with sympathy. Bakhtin makes his points with earnesty, only he is 
misguided at times, and for all his cleverness, he must endure the tragedy of being 
undone by his own efforts to do some good. Eco did say that his novel is open to 
interpretations, however. In a conference on Bakhtinian studied, Caryl Emerson recalls, 
 
Through memoirs recorded in the 1970s about the distant 1910s and 1920s, our Russian 
counterparts in the 1990s were living in to Bakhtin’s multilingual, still thoroughly Europeanized 
world. Those fifty hateful, shameful years had simply dropped away. Miraculously, Bakhtin was 
simultaneously a survivor and a pre-Bolshevik. (Emerson 1997: 33). 
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In order to ensure that his work, like the scholar himself, remains “simultaneously a 
survivor and a pre-Bolshevik”, it may be helpful to indicate the places in which Bakhtin’s 
own writings appear to work against his intentions of promoting an open, dialogic and 
democratic society. 
While writing this thesis, I did wonder whether Eco had Bakhtin’s literary and 
cultural concepts in mind while working on his novel; it is obvious that Eco has read 
Bakhtin, but in the Postscript and interviews, says that he was inspired by Doyle and 
Borges, or his own thesis on medieval aesthetics. There is a possibility that Eco, like 
Benno in his novel, while not consciously thinking of the source, had unwittingly 
remembering the emotions he had felt when reading the book that was his hidden 
inspiration, so that when these feelings arose again, he remembered details from the book 
as well. Benno unknowingly plagiarises the author; maybe Eco unknowingly responds.  
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Kokkuvõte 
 
Probleeme Bahtini esteetikas: „Roosi nimi“ kui kriitiline uurimus karnevalist 
 
Käesolev magistritöö on arutlus Mihhail Bahtini kirjanduslike ja kultuuriliste mõistete 
rakendamise teemal, võttes Umberto Eco romaani „Roosi nimi“ näidiskontekstiks. 
Analüüs käsitleb Bahtini mõistete ´eepiline` ja ´romaanilik` teineteisevahelist 
sõltuvussuhet, ja kasutab Eco romaani näitena, mis toob välja struktuurse vastuolu 
Bahtini esteetikas.  
Bahtin alustas Dostojevski polüfoonilise romaani uurimisega. See uurimus laienes 
hiljem üld-kirjandusteaduslikuks lähenemiseks kogumikus, mis inglise keelde tõlgitud 
kui "The Dialogic Imagination",mis on neli esseed, mis toovad uurimusele lisaks 
Bahtinile iseloomulikud ´eepilise` ja ´romaani` mõisted, asetades need üksteise suhtes 
binaarsesse opositsiooni. Samal ajal, kui eepika on väljakujunenud kirjandusžanr, mis 
distantseerib end olevikulisest ajast, ning kannab endas lõpetatuse muljet, mis mõjub 
lugejale, surudes ta aktiivse osaleja positsioonilt pigem passiivseks vastuvõtjaks, on 
romaan suhteliselt noor žanr, mis koosneb paljudest häältest, mis teoses üksteise suhtes 
kihistunud, ja mis on dialoogile ning interpretatsioonile avatud. Bahtini eepika ja romaani 
mõisted olid tema kirjandusteoorias algupäraselt deskriptiivsed kategooriad. Mõlemad 
mõisted kandusid aga üle tema kultuuriteooriasse, kus autoritaarsed elemendid 
(kultuurilises tsentris) vastavad nüüd ´eepilisele`; ja perifeerne, rahvalik, hübriidne ja 
sotsiaalselt heterogeenne kuuluvad ´romaaniliku` valda. 
Raamatus „Rabelais ja tema maailm“, mis kujutab endast keskaegse esteetika 
käsitlust, laiendas Bahtin oma varasemast ajast pärit ´karnevali` ja ´karnevaliliku` 
mõisteid, politiseerides sellega eepilise ja romaaniliku kultuurist käsitlust. Karneval 
tulenes algselt keskaegsete uusaasta-pidustuste tähistamisest, mille käigus võis lihtrahvas 
riigi- ja kirikuvõimu parodeerida. Bahtin aga politiseerib neid pidustusi, ja pakub välja 
´karnevaliliku` esteetikakäsitluse, väites, et need pidustused kujutavad endast mässu 
kiriku autoriteedi vastu. Bahtin tõlgendab pidustusi ajalikkuse ja sotsiaalse kasvamise 
avaldumisviisina. Pidustuste grotesksetes vormides manifesteerus füüsiliste ja sotsiaalsete 
piiride lõhkumine, ning võimukandjate narrimine ja alavääristamine kujutas endast nende 
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retoorilist alandamist rahvalike häälte sekka turuplatsile. Niisiis vaatleb Bahtin 
karnevalilikkuse-mõiste kaudu kultuuri novellilikke külgi poliitilist võimu pöörava, 
autoriteeti õõnestava ja demokraatlikuna. Bahtin interpreteerib keskaegseid 
uusaastapidustusi kui viivu hetke sotsiaalset võrdsust, ja karnevali kui kõigi perifeersete, 
vulgaarsete, avatud ja mittelõplike kultuurifenomenide tähistamist. Bahtin usub, et see 
romaani mõiste kaudu avatud keskaegne esteetika pakub ausama käsitluse kultuurist, kui 
käsitlus, mis läheneb vastupidisest seisukohast kultuurilisest tsentrist. 
Samal ajal kätkeb karnevalilikkuse mõiste endas sisemist vastuolu: see asetab ühelt poolt 
deskriptiivse ´eepilise` ja teiselt poolt ´novelliliku` teineteise suhtes sõltuvuslikku 
binaarsesse opositsiooni, samas kutsudes üles novellilikku end eepilisest vabastama. End 
binaarse opositsiooni ühe osapoolena defineerides pole ´novellilikul` võimalik end oma 
otsesest vastandlikust teispoolest, ehk ´eepilisest` vabastada. 
Umberto Eco 1980. aastal väljaantud romaan „Roosi nimi“ kätkeb endast 
esteetilist maailma, mis toetub Bahtini karnevali-esteetikale. Samal ajal avatakse selles ka 
´karnevaliliku` puudused: peategelane, vend William Baskerville’ist hoiab Bahtini 
seisukohtadega sarnast joont, tõugates enda ümbert eemale ja vastandudes kõigele 
´eepilisele` häälele iseloomulikule – kirikuvõimu tõsidusele, poliitilisele ja religioossele 
autoriteedile, kiriklikule traditsioonile ja sellega seotud pühakirjatõlgendustele, 
poliitilisele võimule ning materiaalsele rikkusele, eelistades sellele rahvalikku narrimist 
ja naeru. Oluline on märkida, et nii William kui Bahtin usuvad (ekslikult, nagu arvab 
Eco), et kultuurikontekstis eepilise/novelliliku binaarses suhtes novelliliku toetamine viib 
ainsa ja ühese Tõe leidmiseni. 
Eco kommentaari Bahtini mõtetele võib tuletada sellest, et William romaanis 
Tõde otsides läbi kukub, või ebaõnnestub. Nagu Bahtin, näeb William end ümbritsevaid 
sotsiaalseid ja kultuurilisi nähtusi binaarsete opositsioonide valguses. Viimaks adub ta, et 
toetades novellilikku poolt, toetab ta samal ajal taipamatult ka eepilist; et toetades 
kultuuri mahasurutud perifeerseid diskursuseid, annab William õigustuse nende samade 
perifeeriate moodustamiseks. Probleem ei seisne niivõrd binaarses opositsioonis poole 
valimises, vaid binaarses konfiguratsioonis eneses.
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